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CONSTRICTING THE LAW OF FREEDOM:
JUSTICE MILLER, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT,
AND THE SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES
RICHARD

L.

AYNES*

"[O]ne of the canons of construction never to be lost sight of is to
give effect, if possible, to every word of the written law."
Fourteenth Amendment author John A. Bingham'
"Criticism of [the Slaughter-HouseCases] has never entirely ceased,
nor has it ever received universal assent by members of this Court."2
Justice William Moody
INTRODUCHION

The Slaughter-House Cases3 are simultaneously unremarkable
and extraordinary. They are unremarkable because the matter at issue-whether butchers can be required to ply their trade at a central,
state-franchised facility-has long since ceased to be a matter of concern. They are extraordinary because in spite of the fact that three of

the Court's significant legal conclusions have been rejected and "everyone" agrees the Court incorrectly interpreted the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 4 the conclusion that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 5 had no meaningful place in
our constitutional scheme continues to live on.
* John F. Seiberling Professor of Constitutional Law, The University of Akron School of
Law. This article was written under the sponsorship of the Constitutional Law Center established by the United States at the University of Akron in 1986.
The excellent work of my research assistants, Kristen Donohue, Linda Stravalaci, and John
Zanghi is gratefully acknowledged.
1. Referring to the Act of April 10, 1869 in the 1871 debate over the question of whether
Representatives from Mississippi should be seated. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (Mar. 4,
1871).
2. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 96 (1908).
3. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
4. For example, Thomas B. McAffee suggests that this aspect of Miller's decision was
"clearly wrong" and that "this is one of the few important constitutional issues about which
virtually every modem commentator is in agreement." Thomas B. McAffee, ConstitutionalInterpretation-theUses and Limitations of OriginalIntent, 12 U. DAYTON L. REV. 275, 282 (1986).
See also LEONARD W. LEVY, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights, in JUDGMENTS:
ESSAYS ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 64, 69 (1972) ("one of the most tragically
wrong opinions ever given by the Court."); Louis LusKY, BY WHAT RIor?: A COMMENTARY
ON THE SUPREME COURT'S POWER TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION 201 (1975) ("defying the plain
intention of the Constitutors").
5. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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Even those who have a narrow view of the Fourteenth Amendment conclude that beyond due process and equal protection, the
Fourteenth Amendment was "meant to establish some substantial
rights" and that "[tjhese were the 'privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.' 6 Yet almost all sources agree that Justice
Miller's majority opinion in the Slaughter-HouseCases, or at least its
dicta, "virtually scratched [the Privileges or Immunities Clause] from
7
the constitution."
This Article argues that Justice Miller's majority opinion was indeed based on an incorrect reading of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and then explores why Justice Miller, as well as the other Justices in
the majority and the dissents, reached the conclusions they did. Part I
sketches the basis for the view that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to protect substantive rights, primarily the Bill of Rights, from state abridgement.
6. Charles Fairman, What Makes a Great Justice?: Mr. Justice Bradley and the Supreme
Court, 1870-1892, 30 B.U. L. REV. 49, 77 (1950).
Fairman is not totally correct. The legislative history makes it clear that the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment did not mean to "establish" any new substantive rights; rather, they
intended it to be a procedure through which they could enforce existing substantive rights. Richard L. Aynes, On MisreadingJohn Bingham and the FourteenthAmendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57,
73 (1993).
Fairman's general interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment has been disputed. See, e.g.,
MICHAEL K. CuRIs, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE
BILL OF RIGHTS (1986); Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101
YALE L.J. 1193 (1992); Aynes, supra.
7. Fairman, supra note 6, at 78. See also ROBERT H. BoRK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA:
THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF TiE LAW 37, 166 (1990) (the clause has remained "dormant" and
"properly ... a dead letter."); 2 Louis B. BOUDN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 106, 107, 204
(1932) (the Supreme Court had "emasculat[ed]" and "annulled" the Fourteenth Amendment);
RICHARD C. CORTNER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS 10 (1981)
("reduced to insignificance"); 2 CORWIN ON THE CONSTITUTION 125 (Richard Loss ed., 1987)
("at first ... eliminat[ing] the Fourteenth Amendment from the law of the land"); LUSKY, supra
note 4, at 189, 197 ("the crippling interpretation placed on the Privileges or Immunities Clause"
and the "decapitation of the Fourteenth Amendment"); Michael Les Benedict, PreservingFederalism, Reconstruction and the Waite Court, 1978 SuP. Cr. REV. 39, 60 ("virtually eliminating"
the clause "as a source of national power"); Howard Graham, "Builded Better Then They
Knew," Part 1: The Framers,the Railroadsand the FourteenthAmendment, 17 U. Prrr. L. REV.
537, 579 (1956) (Slaughter-House"emasculat[ed]" the clause); Sanford Levinson, Some Reflections on the Rehabilitationof the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the FourteenthAmendment,
12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 71, 73 (1989) (Slaughter-House "ruthlessly eviscerated the Clause of
practically all operative meaning."); Patricia Allan Lucie, White Rights As A Model for Black:
Or-Who's Afraid of the Privilegesor Immunities Clause?, 38 SYRACUSE L. REV. 859 (1987) (the
case belongs in the "dinosaur section" because it "became extinct in 1873"); Walter F. Murphy,
Slaughter-House, Civil Rights, and Limits on Constitutional Change, 32 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 2 (1987)
("gutted the privileges or immunities clause"); Aviam Soifer, Protecting Posterity, 7 NOVA L.
REV. 39, 45 (1982) (Slaughter-House "narrowed this protection ... to redundancy and oblivion"); Stripping Away the Fictions: Interview with Mr. Justice Arthur J. Goldberg, 6 NOVA L.
REV. 553, 557 (1982) (Slaughter-House "virtually wrote the privileges or immunities clause out of
the Constitution"); Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37
CAL. L. REV. 341, 342 (1949) (the clause was "officially killed" in Slaughter-House).
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Part II examines the Slaughter-House decision, summarizing the arguments presented by counsel and analyzing the opinions written by Justices Miller, Field, Bradley, and Swayne. Part III critiques Justice
Miller's opinion. Part IV seeks to explain the positions of the Justices
by examining the political background of each of the Justices and,
where available, their personal reactions to the adoption of the
Amendment. Part V tests this analysis of the opinions and background of the Justices against the popular and professional commentary on the Slaughter-House opinion from 1873 to 1949.
I.

ANTISLAVERY VIEWS LEADING TO
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

The adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment was a thoughtful
and deliberative process. The first version of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was introduced on February 13, 1866,8 some ten
months after the end of the Civil War. The various proposals for an
amendment were discussed intermittently, often in the midst of other

legislation such as the Civil Rights Bill of 1866, until the final debate
on the Fourteenth Amendment itself took place in the House on May
10, 1866, and in the Senate on June 8, 1866. 9 The ratification process
continued for over two years until Congress declared the Amendment
ratified on July 21, 1868.10
The Fourteenth Amendment was, for all practical purposes, also
"ratified" by a large popular vote. It had been proposed by overwhelming majorities in both the House and the Senate. 1 The
Amendment was a "central issue" in the 1866 Congressional elections, 12 when in spite of small mid-term losses, the Republicans retained a commanding control of Congress, holding 143 of 192 seats in
8. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 813 (Feb. 13: 1866). John Bingham was the author
of the privileges or immunities, due process, and equal protection clauses. For biographical information concerning Bingham, see Aynes, supra note 6; Richard L. Aynes, The Impeachment
and Removal of Tennessee Judge West Humphreys: John Bingham's Prologue to the Johnson
Impeachment Trial, II GA. J. S. LEGAL HIsT. 71 (1993); Richard L. Aynes, The Antislavery and
Abolitionist Background of John A. Bingham, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 881 (1988).
9. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2545 (May 10, 1866); id at 3042 (June 8, 1866). The
decision of the House to agree with the changes to the Amendment made by the Senate took
place on June 13, 1866. Id. at 3149 (June 13, 1866).
10. Congress declared its view that the Amendment was ratified on July 21, 1868. Secretary

of State William H. Sewart did not certify the Amendment as being ratified until July 28, 1868.
11. The vote was 128-37 in the House, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2545 (May 10,

1866), and 33-11 in the Senate. Id. at 3042 (June 8, 1866).
12. WILLIAM E. NELSON, TmE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT:
JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 59 (1988).

FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO
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the House and 42 of 53 seats in the Senate. 13 Indeed, William Nelson
recounts the wide public discussion of the Amendment and the fact
that at least some state legislators felt they had a "duty" to ratify the
14
Amendment based upon the results of the Congressional elections.
In the words of New York Governor Reuben E. Fenton: "Never
before in the history of the Government, upon any great question affecting our national interests has there been such unanimity in the
expression of the popular will."'1 5 This "consensus" followed decades
of debate over slavery, the enforcement of the fugitive slave clause,
and the rights of citizens to oppose slavery and its extension.
A key element in that debate was the interpretation of Article IV
of the United States Constitution. Those who struggled legally and
politically against slavery and "Slave Power" saw Article IV, Section 2
of the Constitution' 6 as protecting the substantive rights of United
States citizens.' 7 Among the most important rights thought to be binding upon the states through Article IV, Section 2 were the Bill of
Rights.' 8 By 1866. there was a split among antislavery leaders in Congress over the ability of Congress to provide for the enforcement of
the Bill of Rights against the states.
The majority's view, represented by Iowa Representative and
House Judiciary Committee Chairman James Wilson, was that the
precedents finding constitutional power to enforce the fugitive slave
laws would also support the enforcement of the Bill of Rights through
Article IV against the states. 19 This led to the conclusion that while
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. lId (quoting Governor Fenton's Message, N.Y. COM. ADVERTISER, Jan. 2, 1867, at 4, col.

1).
16. "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens
in the several States." U.S. CONST. art IV, § 2.
While the first reference to "Citizens of each State" is clear, the reference to "Citizens in the
several States" is ambiguous. It could refer to state citizens or to United States citizens. The
modem reading is to change "in" to read "or'; thus, "Citizens [of] the several States." See infra
text accompanying notes 52-56, 139-54.
17. For an analysis of the underlying "national citizenship theory" see Aynes, supra note 6,
at 69-71, 78-79.
18. Id. at 70-74, 79-81. This view is contrary to our understanding of Barron v. Baltimore, 32
U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). In some cases antislavery theorists may, like others in the country, have
simply been unaware of Barron. See Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 29-34, 102 (1949) (providing examples of people who
were unaware of Barron and thought the Bill of Rights applied to the states); Rhinehart v.
Schuyler, 7 Ill. (1 Gilm.) 375, 414 (1845) (unaware of Barron).
In other instances they were aware of Barron and reinterpreted it to mean only that while
the Bill of Rights were obligatory on the states, that obligation could not be enforced. Aynes,
supra note 6, at 71-83.
19. Wilson's view is captured in his statement: "We will turn the artillery of slavery upon
itself." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1118 (Mar. 1, 1866).
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there had been no enforcement of the Bill of Rights against the states,
Congress could provide for such by statute. As Robert Kaczorowki
has emphasized, one of the purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
was to provide such enforcement. 20 A minority Republican view, represented by Fourteenth Amendment author John A. Bingham, adhered to the traditional antislavery "non enforcement" doctrine and
saw the Fourteenth Amendment as the way to cure this "defect" in
21
the Constitution.
Bingham indicated in at least three Fourteenth Amendment-related speeches that it was his intent that the Bill of Rights be enforced
against the states. 22 The spokesman for the Amendment in the Senate, Jacob Howard, indicated that among the privileges and immunities of citizens were the Bill and Rights, and he read most of
Amendments I through VII on the Senate floor. 23 Neither of these
20. Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and
Reconstruction 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863, 932-35 (1986).
21. Aynes, supra note 6, at 71-73. The view that Article IV was only a "compact" and
unenforceable by the federal government was, in addition to those outlined in Aynes, id., made
in legal proceedings in New York, Wisconsin, Kentucky and Massachusetts. In re Sherman M.
Booth, 3 Wis. 2, 86, 96-99, 101-02, 119 (1854) (separate opinion of Smith, J.); In re Booth and
Rycraft, 3 Wis. 157, 192 (1854) (separate opinion of Smith, J.); Thomas Sim's Case, 61 Mass. (7
Cush.) 285, 290 (1851); Argument of William Johnston, on behalf of the Governor of Ohio in
State of Ohio v. Forbes and Armitage, FranklinCounty Kentucky Circuit Ct., reprintedin 2 FuGITIVE SLAVES AND AMERICAN COURTS 269 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1988); Abstract of Gerrit
Smith's argument in Trial of Henry W. Allen, reprinted in 1 FUGIIVE SLAVES AND AMERICAN
CouRTS 233-37 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1988); Argument of Robert Rantoul, Jr. in the Trial of
Thomas Sims, reprintedin 2 FUGrivE SLAVEs AND AMERICAN COURTS 617, 619, 635-37 (Paul
Finkelman ed., 1988).
In 1844, the second edition of Timothy Walker's Introduction to American Law suggested
that were it "not for long acquiescence, there would be good reason to doubt whether Congress
had any power at all" concerning the fugitive slave clause. TIMOTHY WALKER, INTRODUCrION
TO AMERICAN LAW 160 n.1 (2d ed. 1844). Though the note is to the fugitive from justice clause,
the analysis applies to the fugitive slave clause as well and includes a discussion of Prigg.
Modern commentators have suggested that this was, in fact, the proper view of the Constitution. See Paul Finkelman, Story Telling in the Supreme Court, 1995 Sup. CT. REV. - (forthcoming); Paul Finkelman, Sorting Out Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 24 RUrGERs L.J. 605, 614, 620
(1993);Barbara Holden-Smith, Lords of Lash, Loom, and Law: Justice Story, Slavery, and Prigg
v. Pennsylvania, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1086, 1131-32 (1993).
22. Aynes, supra note 6, at 71-74.
23. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (May 23, 1866). "Privileges" and "Immunities" are simply subdivisions of the broader term "rights." If one asked the average citizen to
name the rights of a U.S. citizen, she would undoubtedly list "rights" from the Bill of Rights.
This was as true in the 19th Century, Charles R. Pence, The Construction of the Fourteenth
Amendment 25 AM. L. REV. 536, 540 (1891) (noting the first eight amendments are privileges
and immunities), as it is in the 20th Century. See Russell W. Galloway, SlaughteringSlaughterHouse, 7 CAL- LAW. 16, 18 (1987).
The fact that Howard thought his effort to apply the Bill of Rights against the states was
politically acceptable is shown by his statements to the Senate that it did not matter if a majority
of the Senate wanted to extend the right to vote to African Americans. What was important,
according to Howard, was
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spokesmen was contradicted by any other Representative or
24
Senator.
As far as it can be determined, there were only three constitutional law treatises published after the Fourteenth Amendment was
proposed but before it was adopted, which also spoke to the question
of the meaning of the Amendment. 25 All three of these treatises indicated the Amendment would enforce the Bill of Rights against the
states.
It was with the background of this public debate that the court
heard the Slaughter-House Cases.
II.

OVERVIEW OF THE SLA uGHTER-HOUSE CASES

In 1869, Louisiana gave a private corporation of seventeen individuals an exclusive right to maintain a central slaughter-house south
of New Orleans, but all butchers were allowed to use that facility for a
fee. 26 The butchers who were not part of the corporation challenged
the state's action in federal court. The cases were heard by Justice
Bradley and Judge Woods on the Circuit in 1870.27 Bradley issued
two opinions, giving judgment for the butchers challenging the
statute.28
The corporation brought the case to the Supreme Court, where it
was first argued on January 11, 1872. Because Justice Nelson did not
hear the case, reargument was ordered and the matter was heard
what will the Legislatures of the various States to whom these amendments are submitted do in the premises; what is it likely will meet the general approbation of the people
who are to elect the Legislatures ....The committee was of the opinion that the States
were not prepared to sanction so fundamental a change as would be the concession of
the right of suffrage to the colored race.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866).
24. CURTIS, supra note 6, at 91.
25. TIMOTHY FARRAR, MANUAL OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 145, 196-

202 (1867);

GEORGE W. PASCHAL, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES DEFINED AND
CAREFULLY ANNOTATED 290 (1868); JOHN NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCnON TO THE
CONSTrUTION LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 145-51 (1868). For an analysis of the position taken
in each treatise and biographical information on the authors see Aynes, supra note 6, at 83-94.
Those treatises published between 1866 and 1868 which contain no reference to the Fourteenth Amendment include, WILLIAM WEDGWOOD, THE GOVERNMENT AND LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES (1867); GEORGE COMSTOCK, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW BY JAMES
KENT (11th ed. 1867); WILLIAM ALEXANDER DUER, A COURSE OF LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (1868); THOMAS M. COOLEY, TREATISE ON
THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE
STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (1868).

26. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 39 (1873).
27. Live-Stock Dealers' & Butchers' Ass'n. v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaugh-

ter-House Co., 15 F. Cas. 649 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (No. 8408).
28. Id.
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again on February 3, 4, and 5, 1873.29 The corporation was represented by Republican Senator Matthew Carpenter; 30 Jeremiah S.
Black, a former Pennsylvania Supreme Court Chief Justice, U.S.
31
Supreme Court Reporter, and Democratic U.S. Attorney General;
and Louisiana radical Republican politician Thomas Jefferson Durant. 32 Former U.S. Supreme Court Justice and Confederate Assistant
Secretary of War John A. Campbell and Louisiana lawyer J.Q.A. Fel33
lows represented the independent butchers.
Campbell's argument before the Court presented arguments
based on the common law, and the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments. He extensively traced the history of monopolies in
French and English law, often using antislavery rhetoric to argue that
monopolies were against English common law and American "genius"
and that this monopoly made it "unlawful for men to use their own
land for their own purposes. ' '34 Campbell argued that if the monopoly
was not "void at common law, it would be so under both the thir35
teenth and the fourteenth amendments."
Campbell argued that the monopoly created a "servitude" in the
feudal sense, which the Thirteenth Amendment prohibited. 36 Campbell felt that "[t]he act is even more plainly in the face of the fourteenth amendment" and that the Fourteenth Amendment was "a
37
more comprehensive exposition of the principles" of the Thirteenth.
Campbell maintained that the Amendment "forever destroyed" the
states rights doctrine of John Calhoun and worked an "indefinite en29. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 44.
30. Justice Miller had great respect for the lawyering abilities of Senator Carpenter. Letter
from Miller to William P. Ballinger (Feb. 27, 1881), reprinted in CHARLES FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT 1862-1890, at 116-17 (1939) [hereinafter FAIRMAN ON

Ballinger was Miller's hometown friend and brother-in-law with whom Miller maintained a lifelong friendship and correspondence.
31. Miller thought Black had ability, but he had disdain for Black's character. FAIRMAN ON
MILLER, supra note 30, at 111 (Miller's conversation on Black reduced to memorandum by S.W.
Pennypacker).
32. On September 5, 1866, Durant was one of Chief Justice Chase's guests at a dinner which
included three members of Congress, the Governors of Texas, Missouri and Pennsylvania, and
MILLER].

former U.S. Attorney General Speed. PAPERS OF SALMON P. CHASE 631-632 (John Niven ed.,
1994) [hereinafter CHASE PAPERS]. Chase indicated he urged Durant to support the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 632.

33. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 44. Miller had respect for Campbell's abilities, but
wanted to hold him accountable for deserting the U.S. government and joining the Confederacy.
Letter from Miller to William P. Ballinger (Mar. 18, 1877), reprinted in FAIRMAN ON MILLER,
supra note 30, at 351-52.
34. Slaughter-HouseCases, 83 U.S. 45-49. The full text of the briefs filed can be found in 6
LANDMARK BIEFS 475 (Philip B. Kurland ed., 1975).
35. Slaughter-HouseCases, 83 U.S. at 49.
36. Id. at 49-51.
37. Id. at 51. In the summary in the reported case, the quoted sentence is italicized.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:627

largement" of national authority.38 Campbell indicated that "State
laws must be so framed as to secure life, liberty, property from arbitrary violation and secure protection of law to all" and that this was an
'39
effort to guard "the great personal rights of each and every person.
Campbell argued that the privileges and immunities of the Fourteenth Amendment were "the personal and civil rights which usage,
tradition, the habits of society, written law, and the common sentiments of people have recognized as forming the basis of the institutions of the country." 4 Freedom from monopoly, or the right to
pursue a profession, was a privilege or immunity which Campbell
sought to bring within the protection of the Amendment.
Campbell's equal protection argument was simply that the seventeen members of the new corporation received benefits that were being denied to the 1,000 other butchers. 41 His due process argument
was that the right to labor was property and the butchers were being
deprived of that right without due process of law.4 2 Campbell argued
43
that the "police power" could not overcome this constitutional right.
A.

Justice Miller's Majority Opinion

Justice Miller delivered the opinion of the Court on April 14,
1873, rejecting all of the petitioner's arguments."4 Initially, Miller
pointed to the right of the butchers to continue to work at their trade
in the central slaughter-house and concluded that there was no denial
of a right to pursue a trade. 45 Quoting Kent's Commentaries for the
proposition that slaughter-houses were among "[u]nwholesome
trades" which the state could regulate, Miller found the regulations
appropriate.46
38. Id. at 52-53.
39. Id.at 53.
40. Id at 55. This was consistent with Campbell's suggestion that the rights protected by
the "English Magna Charta" were applied through this Amendment, id. at 54, and his later
statement that the Amendment "assumes that there were privileges and immunities" and is a
command that the state not "abridge" them. Id.at 55.
41. Id. at 56.
42. Campbell made no argument that these individuals had their own facilities which were
now made useless so as to deprive them of that property. Perhaps he thought the police power
could justify that action.
43. Id. at 57.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 60-61.
46. Id. at 62-64. Miller distinguished the English authorities and concluded that Louisiana
had the power to create the exclusive privilege here, unless prohibited by some provision of the
U.S. Constitution. Id. at 65-66.
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Miller then turned to the Thirteenth Amendment "servitude" argument. Looking to the institution of American slavery and using
Chief Justice Chase's Circuit Court opinion in In re Turner47 concerning apprenticeship as an example of the purpose of the Thirteenth
Amendment, he concluded that the servitude spoken of in the Thirteenth Amendment was not of the nature complained of in the case
48
before the Court.
Miller next traced the history of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments. While admitting that only the Fifteenth
Amendment made any reference to race, Miller nevertheless concluded that his "recapitulation of events, almost too recent to be
called history" showed that "the one pervading purpose" of these
amendments was "the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm
establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made
freeman and citizens. '49 Nevertheless, Miller begrudgingly acknowledged that the protection of the Amendments was not limited to African Americans. 50 In discussing the citizenship clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Miller indicated it was designed to define citizenship for
the first time and to overrule Scott v. Sandford.5 1
47. In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247).
48. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 68-69.
49. Id. at 71 (emphasis added). Miller softened this statement in the third numbered paragraph of the syllabus he prepared, concluding that "the letter and spirit of those articles [of
Amendment] must apply to all cases coming within their purview, whether the party concerned
be of African descent or not." Id. at 37.
The syllabus prepared by Judge Woods in the Circuit Court decision below had explicitly
indicated that the Fourteenth Amendment "applie[d] to whites." Live-Stock Dealers' & Butchers' Ass'n. v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 15 F. Cas. 649 (C.C.D.
La. 1870) (No. 8408).
50. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 72. Miller's examples were to the "Mexican or Chinese race" without any explicit indication that it could apply, for example, to these butchers who
were apparently white.
51. Id. at 73. Of course, if Section 1 was intended to overrule Chief Justice Taney's "Opinion of the Court" as Miller suggested, then it might follow that the Bill of Rights was made
applicable to the states. In explaining why he could not believe that the slave-holding states
would have allowed African Americans to be included within the term "citizens" as that word is
used in the Constitution, Taney indicated that if this were so, African Americans would be "entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens." Dred Scott v. Sandford, 50 U.S. (19 How.) 393,
416 (1856). This would "exempt them from the operation of the special laws and from the police
regulations which [the slave-holding states] considered to be necessary for their own safety."
Moreover,
[i]t would give persons of the [N]egro race, who were recognized as citizens in any one
State of the Union ...full liberty of speech in public and private upon all subjects upon
which its own citizens might speak; to hold public meetings upon political affairs, and to
keep and carry arms wherever they went.
Id. at 417.
It may be that Taney assumed that every state guaranteed these First and Second Amendment rights to its citizens and that the equality reading of Article IV would guarantee those
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Miller indicated that "great weight" must be placed upon the distinction between U.S. and state citizenship in Section 1.52 Miller relied
upon Corfield v. Coryel153 as "[tihe first and the leading case" on the
meaning of Article IV, Section 2 and quoted from it extensively. 54 But
while Corfield had up to that time been generally understood to protect the rights of national citizens, Miller. made it appear that it had
protected the rights of state citizens by misquoting both Article IV
and Corfield.55 In this way, Miller concluded that most of the rights of
citizens protected under Article IV, Section 2 were state rights, and
left very little to be federal rights under Section 1 of the Fourteenth
56
Amendment.
Miller suggested a limited number of rights to be protected by
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, each of which was already
protected by the federal government and enforced against the states
by the Supremacy Clause. 57 Miller held that the rights claimed by the
butchers were rights protected by the states and that for them to be
privileges and immunities under Section 1 would "radically" change
the whole nature of the government. 58 Such a reading would "degrade the State governments by subjecting them to the control of Con59
gress" and make the Court a "perpetual censor" of the states.
Because Miller could see no such purpose in the Amendment, he denied the butchers' privileges and immunities claims.
Turning to the due process claim, Miller thought this was the
same as that of the Fifth Amendment and in "nearly all" of the state
constitutions; the only difference was the federal government was now
rights to national citizens as well. But it may also be that Taney meant that Article IV conferred
these rights as substantive protections.
52. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 74-75.
53. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
54. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 75-76.
55. Id. In both instances Miller changed the phrase "citizens in the several states" to read
"citizens of the several states." Though today we view the clause as merely prohibiting discrimination, this is not an obvious reading of the text and is a result of judicial interpretation. Most
courts in the 1800s concluded that Article IV protected substantive rights. JAMES H. KETTNER,
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870, at 258 (1978).
56. See infra notes 139-54 and accompanying text.
57. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 79-80. The single exception to that statement might
be Miller's inclusion of rights he indicated were "guaranteed by the Federal Constitution." Id. at
79. The only examples he gave of these were "[tihe right to peaceably assemble and petition for
redress of grievances, [and] the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus" Id. Though this reference has caused some to think that Miller was suggesting that the Bill of Rights constituted
privileges or immunities under the Amendment, these are more likely structural rights of the
type Miller thought protected by the Supremacy Clause even if the Bill of Rights did not exist.
See infra text accompanying notes 186-98.
58. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 78.
59. Id.
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given the authority to enforce it.60 In his second paragraph concerning
this argument, Miller concluded that "under no construction of that
provision that we have ever seen, or any that we deem admissible",
could the "restraint" Louisiana placed on the trade of the butchers be
61
a deprivation of property.
Finally, Miller turned to the Equal Protection Clause. But here,
unlike his treatment of the Reconstruction amendments as a whole
and his slavery example, Miller suggested an extreme racial limitation:
We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by
way of discrimination against the [N]egroes as a class, or on account
of their race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this
provision. It is so clearly a provision for that race and that emergency, that62a strong case would be necessary for its application to
any other.

63
Miller found "no such case" before him.

In concluding, Miller noted that the "line" between state and national powers had "never been very well defined in public opinion"
and that there were still conflicting views in 1873. 64 In spite of the
"pressure of all the excited feeling growing out of the war," Miller
concluded that "our statesmen have still believed [in] the existence of
the States" and did not mean "to destroy the main features of the
general system. '65 Ignoring the "fluctuations" of "public opinion," on
this subject the Court had "always held with a steady and an even
hand the balance between State and Federal power" and Miller expressed an intent to continue to do so.66
B. Justice Field's Dissent
Four justices dissented. The first dissent-written by Justice Field
and joined by Chief Justice Chase and Justices Swayne and Bradleyhas the appearance of a majority opinion because of its extensive discussion of the facts. 67 While Field was prepared to accept the requirement that the meat be inspected and that animals be slaughtered
"below" the City of New Orleans as proper police regulations, he
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.at 80.
Id. at 81.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 81-82.

65. Id.at 82.
66. Id.

67. Id. at 83-86 (Field, J.,
dissenting). An examination of the dissents in volumes 82, 83, and
84 of the United States Reports fails to reveal any other dissent with the extensive factual introduction which Field provides in his Slaughter-House dissent.
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thought the creation of a "monopoly" at one central slaughter-house
went beyond that power. 68
While ultimately deciding not to rest his dissent on the Thirteenth
Amendment argument, Field nevertheless entered into a discussion of
that provision and, unlike Miller, specifically suggested that it prohibited the slavery of "white men as well as of black men." 69 Drawing
upon antislavery arguments about the right of a free man to his own
labor, Field suggested that the abolition of slavery was intended to
make everyone a "freeman" and thereby give "the right to pursue or'70
dinary avocations of life."
Even while he discussed the Thirteenth Amendment issues,
equality arguments seemed to dominate Field's thought. The pursuit
of a profession could be regulated, but only upon the same terms as
others "of the same age, condition, and sex."' 71 But a person must be
able to "equally" enjoy the "fruits of his labor" as others similarly
situated. 72 Returning to the pure Thirteenth Amendment analysis,
Field suggested that a person who was restricted to pursuing only one
profession, in only one locale-much like the Black Codes might have
required-was really not a freeman, but "in a condition of
servitude."

73

Though Field based most of his dissenting opinion upon the Privileges or Immunities Clause, he continued to express an equal protection concern throughout. Field saw the Fourteenth Amendment as
providing a "supplement to the thirteenth. ' 74 He suggested that the
citizenship clause rejected the view that state citizenship was paramount and national citizenship derivative; instead: "[a] citizen of a
State is now only a citizen of the United States residing in that
State."75
68. Id. at 87 (Field, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 90 (Field, J., dissenting).
70. Id.

71. Id. The notation of "gender" may have been prompted by Field's position in Bradwell
v. The State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873), which followed Slaughter-Housethe next day. Miller

could deny that Myra Bradwell had a federally protected right to pursue the profession of an
attorney and consistently deny the right of the butchers to pursue their trade. But Field, Swayne,
and Bradley had to explain why the butchers had a protected right to pursue their chosen profession but Ms. Bradwell did not. Their explanation was based upon gender classification. Chief
Justice Chase did not have any inconsistency to explain because he also dissented, without opinion, in Bradwell. Id. at 142.
72. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 90 (Field, J., dissenting).

73. Id.
74. Id. at 93 (Field, J.,
dissenting).

75. Id.at 95 (Field, J.,
dissenting).
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Like Miller, Field relied upon Corfield to establish the meaning
of Article IV, which he viewed as protecting substantive rights. 76 He
also read Article IV to require nondiscrimination in these fundamental rights between the citizens of one state against those of another
state. 77 He found the Fourteenth Amendment referred "to the natural and inalienable rights which belong to all citizens," just as Corfield
found with Article IV.78
In summary, Field indicated:
What [Article IV, Section 2] did for the protection of the citizens of
one State against hostile and discriminating legislation of other
States, the fourteenth amendment does for the protection of every
citizen of the United States against hostile and discriminating legislation against him in favor79of others, whether they reside in the
same or in different States.
Because Field concluded the right to pursue a trade was a privilege or immunity now protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, it
followed that all monopolies were prohibited.80 This was so because
81
monopolies infringed upon "liberty" to work and acquire property.
Field provided a discussion of the English Case of Monopolies because
it included language, which he often italicized, that indicated that a
82
monopoly interfered with the "liberty of the subject."
While Field admitted there could be restraints on the pursuit of a
profession, the restraint had to be applied "equally. '8 3 Again, the
very notion of a monopoly violated the "equality of right" by favoring
those who received the monopoly. 84 In the case at bar the "equality
of right" to pursue a trade had been violated.
C. Justice Bradley's Dissent
Though Justice Bradley joined Field's dissent, he also wrote separately. Like Field, Bradley thought that the Fourteenth Amendment
8 5
made U.S. citizenship "primary" and state citizenship "secondary."
76. Id. at 97 (Field, J., dissenting). In quoting Corfield, Field italicized the words indicating
that privileges and immunities are those "which of right belong to the citizens of all free
governments."
77. Id. at 98 (Field, J.,
dissenting) ("No discrimination can be made by one State against the
citizens of other states" in the enjoyment of privileges or immunities).
78. Id. at 96 (Field, J.,dissenting).
79. Id. at 100-01 (Field, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 101 (Field, J., dissenting).
81. Id.
82. Id at 102-03 (Field, J.,dissenting).
83. Id. at 105 (Field, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 109 (Field, J.,dissenting).
85. Id. at 112-13 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
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Bradley began with the proposition that the "right, liberty, or privilege" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment included the right to
choose any lawful employment. 86 Bradley indicated that without the
"right to choose one's calling" one "cannot be a freeman. '87 Although
admitting that the state's right to regulate occupations under its police
power, Bradley, like Field, found that the state's regulations here went
beyond its articulated interest.8 8 While acknowledging that the state's
power of regulation was "undoubtedly a very broad and extensive
one", Bradley indicated that it was limited by "certain fundamental
89
rights.",
Bradley's discussion of the Article IV Privileges and Immunities
Clause and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment reiterated standard abolitionist/antislavery analysis. 90
Bradley argued that Miller's view of American citizenship would
make it "an empty name" and that Miller had relegated the "rights,
privileges, and immunities of the greatest importance" to the state's
protection alone. 91
Bradley relied upon the "often-quoted" language in Corfield,
which he found "very instructive. ' 92 Unlike Miller, Bradley quoted
Corfield correctly and specifically pointed out Miller's change of language in both Article IV and Corfield.93 Bradley acknowledged that
"usually" the Court had treated Article IV as protecting the "equality" of rights, but suggested that this was so because equality is "one
of the privileges and immunities of every citizen" and because it had
not become "necessary to vindicate any other fundamental privilege
of citizenship." 94
Bradley emphasized that "the language of the clause ... seems
fairly susceptible of a broader interpretation than that which makes it
a guarantee of mere equality of privileges with other citizens." 95 Brad86. Id. at 113 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 116 (Bradley, J.,dissenting).
88. Id. at 119-20 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 114 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
90. One could oppose slavery or "The Slave Power" without being an abolitionist. There is
no suggestion that Bradley was an abolitionist or even an antislavery advocate. But those theories were widely discussed, providing the basis for much of the activity of the 39th Congress and
Bradley was undoubtedly well aware of them.
91. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 116 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 117 (Bradley, J.,dissenting).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 118 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
95. Id. (Bradley, J.,dissenting).
The Court's then recent decision in Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1870), was
consistent with Bradley's view. Maryland created a tax which discriminated against non-resi-
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ley indicated that one need not look to English law for these privileges. Rather, "an authoritative declaration of some of the most
important privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States"
were found "in the Constitution itself."' 96 After referring to the original privileges and immunities contained in Article I, Section 9, Bradley observed that "others of the greatest consequence were
enumerated, although they were only secured, in express terms, from
invasion by the Federal Government" in the constitution. 97
At that point Bradley listed the right of habeas corpus, right of
trial by jury, 98 free exercise, free speech, free press, the rights of assembly, 99 the prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures' 0 0 and the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause:' 01 "These,
and still others are specified in the original Constitution, or in the early

dents. The tax was challenged on grounds of "direct discrimination" and not on a claim of substantive immunity from taxation. Id. at 421. See also Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168
(1868) (corporation is not a "citizen" for purposes of Article IV, Section 2); Conner v. Elliott, 59
U.S. (18 How.) 591 (1855) (community property by virtue of marriage is not a privilege within
the scope of Article IV, Section 2).
The language of Article IV speaks of citizens being entitled to "all privileges and immunities
of citizens." If it had been intended to protect only equality, then, contrary to the language, there
is only one privilege and immunity: that of being treated equal. Cf. ROGER HOWELL, THE PRiVILEGES AND IMMUNMES OF STATE CmZENSHIP 105 (1918). If this was the object of Article IV,
Section 2, then it would have been written in words similar to the Equal Protection Clause. The
only way the language of Article IV, Section 2 makes sense is to read it as a substantive guarantee of rights.
96. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 118 (Bradley, J., dissenting). Earlier in his opinion
Bradley indicated that Americans "brought with them... the rights of Englishmen." Id. at 114
(Bradley, J., dissenting). These included the Magna Carta and habeas corpus, summarized by
Blackstone's classifications of "absolute rights of individuals" as "the right of personal security,
the right of personal liberty, and the right of private property." Id. at 115 (Bradley, J., dissenting). It is these rights of life, liberty and property-and not simply the right that one will not
lose life, liberty, or property without due process of law-which Bradley indicated "belong to the
citizens of every free government." Id. at 116 (Bradley, J., dissenting). Bradley, in a reference
to the Declaration of Independence, indicated that "the pursuit of happiness" was equivalent to
the right to "property". Id. at 115-16 (Bradley, J., dissenting). While Bradley did use the deprivation language, he also indicated that these rights could "only be interfered with, or the enjoyment of which can only be modified, by lawful regulations necessary or proper for the mutual
good of all." Id. at 116 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 118 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
98. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI-VII.

99. U.S. CONST. amend. I (except for the Establishment Clause). This was consistent with
Bradley's Circuit Court opinion where he indicated that Louisiana's police power could not "interfere with liberty of conscience, nor with the entire equality of all creeds and religions before
the law." Live-Stock Dealers' & Butchers' Ass'n. v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing &
Slaughter-House Co., 15 F. Cas. 649, 653 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (No. 8408).
100. U.S. CONsT. amend IV.
101. Slaughter-HouseCases, 83 U.S. at 118 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
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amendments of it, as among the privileges and immunities of citizens
of the United States .... "102
Bradley also indicated that unenumerated privileges included
buying, selling, and enjoying property, engaging in any lawful employment, and using the law for "redress of injuries and the like.' 0 3 Bradley acknowledged that, "except in a few instances,"'1°4 "[p]rior to the
fourteenth amendment" these privileges and immunities could not be
enforced "for want of the requisite authority."' 105 But the Amendment
changed this and provided enforcement power. o6
Bradley termed Miller's attempt to limit the Amendments to African Americans a "futile" argument:
The mischief to be remedied was not merely slavery and its incidents and consequences; but that spirit of insubordination and disloyalty to the National government ... and that intolerance of free

speech and free discussion which often rendered life and property
insecure, and led to much unequal legislation.' 07
Likewise, Bradley discounted Miller's concerns about Congress
supervising the states. "Like the prohibition against passing a law impairing the obligation of a contract, it would execute itself.' 08 But
even if it did require legislation, Bradley said the "great question is,
What is the true construction of the amendment?"'1 9 In Bradley's
mind "inconvenience" had no role to play in the case because "[tihe
National will and National interest are of far greater importance. '"" 0
In essence, Bradley argued that Miller had missed the purpose and
result of the Union victory in the Civil War.
102. Id. at 118-19 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Bradley proceeded to suggests
that these rights may apply to all persons "whether citizens or not." Id. at 119 (Bradley, J.,

dissenting).
103. Id. at 119.
104. Id. at 121 (Bradley, J., dissenting). Bradley was probably referring to the rights given
against the state in Article I, Section 9.
105. Id. at 121.
106. Id. at 122 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 123 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
108. Id. This same argument was presented by John Norton Pomeroy as late as 1881. SOME
AccouNT OF THE WORK OF STEPHEN J. FIELD, WITH AN INTRODUCTORY SKETCH BY JOHN NORTON POMEROY 56, 144 (1881) [hereinafter SOME AccouNT]. Page 56 is part of Pomeroy's intro-

duction. It is unclear who actually authored page 144.
109. Slaughter-HouseCases, 83 U.S. at 124 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
110. Id. Bradley never directly confronted Miller's claim that such a radical change in the
government required a clearer statement. Given his view of the Amendment giving enforcement
power to fundamental rights which already existed, id. at 118-19, 122 (Bradley, J., dissenting),
Bradley probably did not see this as a radical change. Further, Bradley's suggestion that the
Court look to the "true construction" of the Amendment implied a rejection of Miller's "unclearness" argument. Id. at 124 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
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D. Justice Swayne's Dissent
In his dissenting opinion Justice Swayne relied upon Field's and
Bradley's opinions to support his views of the merits of the cases
before them. 1 ' Swayne's separate opinion was directed solely to the
effect of the new Amendments and reads as if it came right out of the
Congressional debates. Undeterred by Miller's fear of a "radical"
change in the government, Swayne embraced the Reconstruction
Amendments as "a new departure" and "an important epoch" in constitutional history. 112 The Reconstruction Amendments "trench directly upon the power of the States, and deeply affect those bodies.
1 3
They are, in this respect, at the opposite pole from the first eleven. "
Ignoring Taney's opinion in Scott v. Sanford"14 and articulating
traditional antislavery doctrine, Swayne indicated that a "citizen of a
State is ipso facto a citizen of the United States." 1 5 Swayne interpreted Article IV as protecting equality in state-created privileges or
immunities." 6 Referring to "equal protection of the laws," Swayne
indicated that "all" were placed "upon a footing of legal equality and
give[n] the same protection to all for the preservation of life, liberty,
17
and property, and the pursuit of happiness."
Responding to Miller's argument about the radical change in government, Swayne indicated that the "prejudices and apprehensions as
to the central government ...

were dispelled by the ight of experi-

ence. 11 8 He continued, "It is objected that the power conferred is
novel and large. The answer is that the novelty was known and the
measure deliberately adopted."" 19
Further, Swayne, unlike Miller, had no apprehensions about the
effect of the change. He termed the Amendments "all eminently conservative in their character. They are a bulwark of defence, and can
never be made an engine of oppression.' 20 Indeed, Swayne saw the
Amendments as desirable, stating that without such "authority" a na111. Id. at 128 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 125 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
113. Id.
114. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
115. Id. at 126 (Swayne, J., dissenting),
116. Id. at 127 (Swayne, J., dissenting),
117. Id. Note that Swayne, like Bradley, did not limit the life, libertyand property protection to "deprivation" by the government, but rather referred to "protection... for the preserva.
tion of life, liberty, and property." Id. (Swayne, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 128 (Swayne, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 129 (Swayne, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 128 (Swayne, J., dissenting). See also id. at 129 ("[T]he power is beneficent in its
nature, and cannot be abused").
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tional government was "glaringly defective."'1 21 Noting that before the
Civil War there was "ample" protection against national "oppression"
and "little ... against wrong and oppression by the states," Swayne

concluded "[tjhat want was intended to be supplied by this
22
amendment."1
III.

ANALYSIS OF JUSTICE MILLER'S OPINION

A.

Criticisms

Though Miller regarded Slaughter-House as "the ablest opinion
he ever prepared,"' 123 his craftsmanship has not received high evaluations from scholars. Louis Lusky complained about "the shabbiness
of the Court's reasoning"' 24 and Sanford Levinson has called it "shoddily justified.' 25 Walter Murphy contrasted the fact that Miller was
"among the most able of judges" with the fact that his opinion was an
26
"intellectual shambles.'
There are four important difficulties with the Fourteenth Amendment aspect of Miller's opinion: (1) Miller's claim that the equal protection was directed almost exclusively toward African Americans was
historically inaccurate and ignored an obvious reading of the text of
the Amendment; (2) Miller's textual argument, distinguishing between the rights of national citizens and the rights of state citizens,
was based upon his deliberate misquotation of Article IV and of the
Corfield case; (3) Miller's discussion of the citizenship clause demonstrated either woeful ignorance or duplicity by failing to discuss the
Civil Rights Act of 1866; and (4) Miller's ultimate justification of his
opinion was misplaced. Each of these will be discussed in turn.
1. Miller's Attempt to Limit Equal Protection
Justice Miller's opinion would not have been so problematic if he
had claimed only that one of the primary goals of the Reconstruction
Amendments was the protection of African Americans. 127 But his
claim that equal protection would be limited almost exclusively to African Americans is inexplicable. As Miller acknowledged, unlike the
121. Id. at 129 (Swayne, J., dissenting).
122. Id.
123. Justice Harlan on Justice Miller, 31 CENTRAL L.J. 333 (1890).
124. LuSKY, supra note 4, at 197.
125. Levinson, supra note 7, at 73.
126. Murphy, supra note 7, at 5.
127. The focus is upon Miller's opinion because he was the only one who wrote for the
majority. But a statement by conservative Republican Senator Timothy 0. Howe suggests that
Howe had been told by someone in the majority that they did not agree with Miller's rationale:
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Fifteenth Amendment, which made reference to race, the Fourteenth
128
Amendment was framed in broader language.
Contemporary sources believed Miller's reading of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause to be wrong. For example, on May 24, 1873, The Chicago Legal News concluded that the
Slaughter-Housemajority had given "to the colored citizen, rights and
privileges not possessed by the white citizen."'1 29 Similarly, in the 1874
edition of Sedgwick's Statutory and ConstitutionalLaw, 130 John Norton Pomeroy criticized Miller's claim by saying that it was "utterly
unnecessary to the decision of the case"'131 and "contradict[ed] at once
1 32
the meaning of language and the facts of history."'

While it has been suggested that Miller's memory of the history
of the Amendments was "dimming" by 1873,133 others have not been
so charitable. William Nelson called Miller's view an "extreme position" which the Court rejected by 1876.13 Walter Murphy characterized Miller's reading as an attempt to change "any person" to read
"any [N]egro" and as contrary to "the amendment's plain words.' 35
Eric Foner has suggested that a review of Congressional debates seri136
ously undermines Miller's limitation.
Indeed, the debates are replete with indications that the Fourteenth Amendment was also intended to protect Southern white
Unionists, Northerners moving South, and aliens. 137 Bingham himself
Mr. President, I am glad to feel authorized to say that that is not the conclusion of the

court. I understand that to be a part of the argument simply by which the justice who
delivered the opinion of the majority undertook to defend the judgment of the court.
43 CONG. REC. 4148 (May 22, 1874) (emphasis added).
Though the truth is likely to remain unknown, Howe's statement leaves open the possibility
that one or more of the Justices in Miller's majority may have joined on narrower grounds.
128. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 71-72.
129. The Recent Amendments to the U.S. Constitution Construed, 5 CHI. LEGAL NEws 414
(May 24, 1873). The newspaper was edited by Myra Bradwell who, by then, had lost her own
effort to use the Privileges or Immunities Clause to gain admission to the Illinois bar. Bradwell
v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
130. THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (John Norton Pomeroy

ed., 2d ed. 1874).
131. Id. at 565 n.(b).
132. Id. at 564 n.(b). As late as 1881 Pomeroy continued to argue that the dissent in Slaughter-House was correct. SOME ACCOUNT, supra note 108, at 54-55.
133. HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EOUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTrruTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1835-1875, at 437-38 (1982).
134. NELSON, supra note 12, at 179.

135. Murphy, supra note 7, at 2.
136. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at

530 (1988).
137. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1065 (Feb. 27, 1866) (John Bingham indicating that
the Amendment would protect Southern Unionists).
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made the distinction between the Magna Carta, which protected only
the "freemen", and the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, which
"adopted in its stead the more comprehensive words 'no person.""' 138
It was hardly possible that it escaped the framers or the ratifiers that
the Fourteenth Amendment applied to all "citizens" in one part and in
other parts to all "persons."
2. Miller's Misquotations
A large part of Justice Miller's privileges and immunities argument was premised upon the distinction between the privileges and
immunities of state citizenship and those of national citizenship. To
establish this distinction, Miller first looked to Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and the
139
State wherein they reside.
While this clause established simultaneous citizenship, it did not
suggest in any way that the rights of those citizens were different. To
reach that determination Miller relied upon Article IV, Section 2
which provides, in relevant part:
The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.
According to Louis Lusky,140 Miller "deliberately misquote[d]"
this clause by writing it, with quotation marks around the entire provision, as follows:
"The citizens of each State shall be entitled to4 all the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the several States."' '
Even prior to the adoption of the Amendment, many believed that the American government was based upon equal protection of the laws. Bingham indicated that the Constitution
recognized "the absolute equality before the law of all persons, whether citizens or strangers."
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (Jan. 9, 1866). In an era where Christian religion was a
strong force, aliens were often referred to as "thy stranger that is within thy gates." Exodus 20:10
(King James). See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1292 (Mar. 9, 1866) (speech of John
Bingham: "Ye shall have the same law for the stranger as for one of your own country"). A
religious base to the Equal Protection Clause was seen in Deuteronomy 27:19: "Cursed be he
that pervereth the judgment of the stranger."
138. CONo. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1638 (1862). In that same speech, Bingham indicated the Fifth Amendment applied to those born in America, Asia, Africa, and Europe and to
every "person," "human being" and "member" of the "family of man." Id.
See also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1291-92 (Mar. 9, 1866) (Bingham stating that
Rep. Wilson had indicated that the word "inhabitant" had been printed in the Civil Rights Bill
by mistake instead of "citizens," and that Bingham objected to "citizen" because it was narrower
than "person").
139. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
140. LUSKY, supra note 4, at 194-95.
141. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 75 (emphasis added).
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By inserting the word "the" before privileges and immunities and
changing the word "in" to make the clause read "of the several
States" instead of "in the several States" Miller made this provision
appear to protect state, not national rights.
Miller's opinion would help this become the modem reading of
the Article IV, Section 2.142 But in 1873 Bingham's national citizenship reading was "the dominant judicial understanding" of the
clause. 143 Indeed, Justice Swayne, in his dissent, thought the provision
"intelligible and direct" with no need for "analysis" or
"construction."'"
Miller also paraphrased Article IV as setting forth rights "of citizens of the several states"'145 and in purporting to quote Justice Washington's opinion in Corfield v. Coryell,'4 misquoted Justice
Washington by inserting the word "of' for "in" between "citizens"
and "the several states."' 147 Justice Bradley called attention to these
misquotations in his dissenting opinion. i '4 Yet this language not only
remained in Justice Miller's majority opinion 149 but also appeared in
the syllabus of the opinion.'5 0
The significance of this is found by reference again to antislavery
doctrine. The reference to "citizens in the several states" is unclear as
to whether the reference is to U.S. citizens or state citizens. Chancel142. The modem reading of Article IV is inconsistent with both early precedent and the
plain reading of the text. See supra note 127-38 and accompanying text.
143. KETrNER, supra note 55, at 255-61.
Robert Palmer, while acknowledging that Miller misquoted Article IV and Corfield, defends Miller by indicating that Miller was merely "updat[ing] his sources." Robert C. Palmer,
The Parameters of ConstitutionalReconstruction: Slaughter-House, Cruikshank, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1984 U. ILL L. REv. 739, 754, 756 (1984). It may be that Palmer accepts the
"modem" non-discrimination view of Article IV, assumed that this view was undisputed by 1873,
and that Miller changed the language of both Article IV and Corfield to be consistent with that
view.
144. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 126 (Swayne, J., dissenting). In an obvious reference
to Miller's majority opinion, Swayne wrote of "analysis to eliminate [Section l's] meaning", that
"[e]very word employed has an established signification", and that "[e]laboration may obscure,
but cannot make clearer, the intent." Id. (Swayne, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 74.
146. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
147. For Miller's misquotation, see Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 76. For Washington's
actual quotation, see Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551.
148. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 117-18 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 74-76.
150. 83 U.S. at 37, in paragraph 4 of syllabus number 3. The Lawyer's Edition of the case
indicates that the syllabus was prepared by Justice Miller. 21 L Ed. 394, 395 (1873).
The Democrats who relied upon Miller's opinion to oppose the Civil Rights Act of 1875
quoted his opinion accurately by quoting his mis-paraphrase of Article IV, Section 2, and yet,
when referring to the clause itself, quoted it accurately. 43 CONG. REC. 4086-87 (May 20, 1874)
(statement of Sen. Thurman).
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lor Kent thought that a citizen of a state was, ipso facto, a citizen of
the United States, and antislavery leaders, like John Bingham,
adopted this view. 151 This meant the importance of the reference is
not to which citizen it is referring, but rather to which collection of
rights: rights guaranteed nationally or rights guaranteed locally. Bingham's public reading of the Amendment was as if the clause had an
ellipsis and, if properly read, referred to "citizens of the United States
in the several states."'1 52 This view was shared by Senator Howard,
who was the spokesman for the Fourteenth Amendment in the
Senate. 153
Miller's opinion has been generally understood to indicate that
the privileges and immunities of state citizens and those of federal
citizens were independent and mutually exclusive. 154 In this too,
Miller was obviously in error. Many of the same rights are protected
by both the state and the federal constitutions.
3. Miller on Citizenship
In speaking of the Fourteenth Amendment citizenship clause,
Miller indicated that "[n]o such definition was previously found in the
Constitution, nor had any attempt been made to define it by act of
Congress."' 55 Yet the Civil Rights Act of 1866 had explicitly defined
citizenship as follows: "That all persons born in the United States and
not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are
56
hereby declared to be citizens of the United States.'
It is difficult to know what to make of this omission. The debate
57
over the Civil Rights Act had been strong and widely publicized.
President Johnson vetoed the act on constitutional grounds and Congress had overridden his veto. 58 This was generally thought to be
151. See CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 984 (Feb. 11, 1859); Aynes, supra note 6, at 6970, 78-79.
152. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 984 (Feb. 11, 1859).
153. CONo. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2764-68 (May 23, 1866). For a collection of similar

views, see Aynes, supra note 6, at 78-79.
Though not addressing these concerns, John Harrison reaches a contrary view, suggesting

that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was intended to protect state-created rights. John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L. J. 1385 (1992).
154. Michael Conant, Antimonopoly Tradition Under the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments:
Slaughter-House Cases Re-Examined, 31 EMORY L. J. 785, 824 (1982). Contra Palmer, supra
note 143, at 744 n.28, 745.
155. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 72.
156. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (April 9, 1866).
157. CHARLES FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUcriON AND REUNION 1864-1888, PART ONE 1169-1204

(1971).
158. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1809 (Apr. 6, 1866) (Senate); id. at 1861 (House).
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only the second time in history Congress had overridden a President's
veto. 159 This "momentous" event was one of the major political and
legal events of the age and yet Miller acted as if he did not know it
had occurred. 16"
Further, the citizenship clause lacks the interpretative power
Miller attributed to it. If he followed the debates in Congress at all or
if he reviewed the Congressional Globe, he knew that the citizenship
clause was added in the Senate at the last moment to write into the
constitution the antislavery view that the Thirteenth Amendment
granted citizenship along with freedom. 161 As historian Eric Foner
has pointed out, Miller's conclusion about the distinctions between
the privileges and immunities of state and federal citizens "should
have been seriously doubted by anyone who read the Congressional
debates of the 1860s."162

4. Miller's Ultimate Justification
Ultimately, Miller's opinion rested upon his view that to give the
Privileges or Immunities Clause the meaning sought would "radically
change... the whole theory of the relations of the State and Federal
Governments to each other and of both of these governments to the
people" and cause the Court to be "a perpetual censor upon all legislation of the States, on the civil rights of its own citizens."'1 63 Yet, it is
not disputed that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to change
the relationship between the states and the federal government.
In determining how "radical" of a change the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to make, one must first determine what the relationship was before the change. People like House Judiciary
Chairman James R. Wilson, a Republican from Iowa, thought that Ar159. K.C. Cerny, Appendix to the Opinion of the Court, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 455, 456
(1979). The first veto overridden by Congress occurred in 1845. Congress overrode President
John Tyler's veto of a bill providing that no revenue cutter could be built unless there was a prior
Congressional appropriation. JOSEPH NATHAN KANE, FAMOUS FIRST FAcTS 687 (4th ed. 1981).
160. Cerny, supra note 159, at 456. In an interesting and important article, Robert Palmer
suggested that Miller omitted any reference to the act because its constitutionality was open to
question. Palmer, supra note 143, at 756.
Yet Miller did not purport to look for a firmly established, well-accepted definition by Congress. Instead, his language indicated that such a definition had never been "attempted" by Congress. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 72. Further, as Kaczorowski has observed, the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 had been upheld as constitutional by every federal Court considering the
question and by the majority of state courts. Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Chase Court and Fundamental Rights: A Watershed in American Constitutionalism,21 N. Ky. L. REV. 151, 161 (1993).
161. FAIRMAN, supra note 157, at 1291-96.
162. FONER, supra note 136, at 503.
163. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 78.
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ticle IV, Section 2 already authorized the enforcement of the Bill of
Rights against the states and that the Fourteenth Amendment, like the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, merely provided an enforcement mechanism
which had been previously lacking. 164 Other Republicans, like John
Bingham, thought that Article IV, Section 2 required the Bill of
Rights to be followed by the states, but, unlike Wilson, thought there
was no authority for federal enforcement. In their eyes the change
wrought by the Amendment was to add enforcement power by the
165
federal government.
Whether viewed from the Wilson wing of the party or the Bingham wing, the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities
Clause was mainly about requiring the states to do what they should
have done all along. It might be a significant and an important
change, but it was not a "radical" change in the form of the government in the way it was portrayed by Justice Miller. To the contrary,
the Republicans responded to the claim that this was a violation of
state's rights by indicating that the state never had a right to violate
these individual rights; therefore opposition was a plea for "state
66
wrongs."1
On the other hand, for people who believed that the states had no
obligations to abide by any of the Bill of Rights, 67 this may have been
a "radical" change. 6 8 As G. Edward White has suggested, both
Miller and Chase were not acting upon short-run principles, but rather
acting out their ante-bellum principles. 69 They reached different results, in part, because of different ante-bellum views. The difficulty in
the Slaughter-House Cases, however, is that the change sought by the
Fourteenth Amendment was evident no matter which of the ante-bellum principles one was devoted to and the magnitude of the change
was legally irrelevant to implementing it.
Of course it might well be argued that even federal enforcement
of such rights was, itself, a revolutionary act. But this was the very
point Wilson himself countered. Wilson relied upon Prigg v. Penn164. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1292 (Mar. 9, 1866).
165. Aynes, supra note 6, at 71-72.

166. E.g., 43 CONG. REc. 340 (Dec. 19, 1873) (Statement of Rep. Butler). See also CONG.
GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 136 app. (Jan. 13, 1857) (Statement of Rep. Bingham). In speaking
of his theory that only the original states could have slavery, Bingham indicated that the states

were equal "in the right" but "unequal in the right to do Wrong."
167. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
168. Even for these people, however, the change as articulated by Bradley was not nearly so
radical as that claimed by Miller.

169. G. Edward White, Reconstructingthe ConstitutionalJurisprudence of Salmon P. Chase,
21 N. Ky. L. REv. 41, 115-16 (1993).
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sylvania170 for the enforcement power and much of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, for example, was taken from the Fugitive Slave Act of
1850.171 Opponents were hard pressed logically to deny that federal
power used to enforce slavery without any explicit constitutional authority could not be used to protect freedom with the explicit constitutional authority of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Nor would this result in any wide-ranging use of federal power to
regulate the states. The most logical reading of Justice Washington's
interpretation of Article IV, Section 1 in Corfield is that "fundamental" was not being used in a natural law sense, but rather as a synonym
for "constitutional.' ' 1 72 This would mean that the Article IV privileges
and immunities would most reasonably be limited to those specified in
the constitution: the Bill of Rights, and those set forth in Article I,
Section 9.173 This is, of course, the same result as that articulated by
Justice Bradley in his dissent.
170. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
171. Kaczorowski, supra note 160, at 156. See Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462
(1850).
172. Conant, supra note 154, at 817.
Black's Law Dictionary has no "natural law" definition for "fundamental." But it defines
"fundamental law" as: "The law which determines the constijution of government in state, and
prescribes and regulates the manner of its exercise; the organic law of a state; the constitution."
BLACK's LAW DICIONARY 674 (6th ed. 1990).
Rights protected under the Ninth Amendment would, like Crandell v. Nevada rights, be
protected whether the Fourteenth Amendment existed or not. What the Fourteenth Amendment
added was enforcement by the federal government of those natural right codified in the Federal
constitution which heretofore had not been applied to the states.
173. This view could be based upon the concept that, notwithstanding the Ninth Amendment, most of the "fundamental rights" had been codified in the original Constitution or the Bill
of Rights. Though reading the Slaughter-House Cases in a way much different than most, Robert
Palmer nevertheless concludes the "most rational" way to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment
is that the privileges and immunities constitute the first eight amendments and "much of article I
section 9." Palmer, supra note 143, at 740-41.
Though less probable, Conant's suggestion that this referred not just to the United States
Constitution, but also to the "rights of Englishmen" including common law matters is still a
reasonable reading of the clause. This could include "constitutional" portions of the common law
such as Magna Carta (1215), the Petition of Rights (1628), the Habeas Corpus Act (1679), and
the Bill of Rights of 1689. These documents are all reproduced in SouRCES OF OUR LIBERTIES
(Richard L. Perry ed., 2d ed. 1978).
Or, as John Gibbons has suggested, the Northwest Ordinance could be looked to as defining
these rights (religious liberty, habeas corpus, trial by jury, proportionate representation, due
process, bail except in certain capital cases, moderate fines, no cruel and unusual punishment,
due process of law and jury of peers, no interference with contracts, schools encouraged, no
slavery or involuntary servitude). John G. Gibbons, Intentionalism, History, and Legitimacy, 140
U. PA. L. REv. 613, 634-37 (1991).
Read together, the "rights" outlined in these various documents are often redundant. See,
e.g., 43 CONG. REC. 455 (Jan. 7, 1874) (Rep. Butler suggesting that all rights under British Magna
Carta were protected under the U.S. Constitution). But they are clearly ascertainable and more
manageable and limited than Miller's own "rights" derived from "inherent limitations" on government or from the structure of government itself. See Citizen's Say. & Loan Assoc. v. Topeka
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One of the extraordinary aspects of Miller's opinion was that his
wide-ranging treatment of the Privileges or Immunities Clause was
unnecessary. Miller could have found that pursuing a profession was
a privilege or immunity, but that it was not "abridged" here. 174 He
could have found that this "abridgment" was still a "reasonable regulation," justified by the state's police power. Or, he could have found
that it was not a privilege or immunity of federal citizenship. All of
these approaches would have limited the scope of the decision, a prudent judicial approach to a new amendment. By going beyond these
limited questions, Miller deliberately embarked on a much wider
ranging mission.
B.

Defenses of Miller's Opinion

The only person to attempt to defend Miller's opinion on
originalist grounds has been Justice Frankfurter. 175 Frankfurter argued, in effect, that the contemporary Court was more likely to have
known and expressed the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment than
176
any individual member of Congress.

Most place Miller's defense upon making a choice between two
otherwise untenable positions. In 1950 Charles Fairman claimed that
"[tihe words meant too much, or almost nothing. The majority chose
the latter alternative.' 77 This is part of the suggestion that Miller's
opinion was an attempt to keep the Court from exercising the type of
free-wheeling judgment under the Privileges or Immunities Clause
78
that it was later to do under due process during the Lochner era.
Yet it is evident that Court was not forced to choose between any
such extremes. While it is true that Attorney Campbell's definition of
privileges and immunities might well have placed every right under
the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, 179 Justice Bradley ofCity, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 662-63 (1874); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (19 Wall.) 35, 43-44
(1867).
174. Indeed, Miller seems to suggest as much. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 66.
175. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
176. Id. at 64.
177. Fairman, supra note 6, at 78. See also LusKY, supra note 4, at 199 (in Miller's view he
had "to restrict the Privileges or Immunities Clause to nearly nothing, or to interpret it as a selfexecuting source of a full panoply of legal rights"); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 183
(1941) (Jackson, J., concurring) (the Court "always hesitated to give any real meaning to the
privileges and immunities clause lest it improvidently give too much").
178. Charles Fairman, Justice Samuel F. Miller, 50 POt Sci. Q. 15, 26-28 (1935).
179. Slaughter-HouseCases, 83 U.S. at 52. See generally Harrison, supra note 153.
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fered the manageable standard of using the text of the Constitution as
180
the basis for identifying privileges and immunities.
Further, Justice Miller's own conduct in other cases suggests that
"judicial restraint" played no part in his decision. In Loan Association
v. Topeka18' Justice Miller had no reluctance in holding that freedom
from taxation except for a public purpose was a right "beyond the
control of the state."' 8 2 This was not based upon Due Process or any
other provision of the Constitution. Instead, in what might be regarded as part of a natural law theory, Miller based his holding upon
the view that "It]here are limitations on such power which grow out of
the essential nature of all free government. Implied reservations of
individual rights, without which the social compact could not exist,
183
and which are respected by all government entitled to the name."
It seems hardly possible that Miller could consistently act in
Slaughter-Housein order to avoid abuse of a provision explicitly in the
Constitution and then reach the decision he did in Topeka without
reliance upon any constitutional provision, if his intent was to defeat
substantive due process or natural law type concepts. 184 Indeed, if
Justice Miller was willing to "find" rights from the structure of the
government, as he did in Crandall v. Nevada 85 and from natural law
concepts, like he did in Topeka, then he held open the door for judicial creation of all types of rights.
A more appealing alternative has been to suggest that Justice
Miller's opinion has been misunderstood. Robert Palmer, for example, has suggested that Miller's opinion could have contemplated the
Bill of Rights and many of the rights list in Article I, Section 9, as
privileges and immunities of national citizenship under Section 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 6 This theory is based largely on the
portion of Miller's opinion which includes as Fourteenth Amendment
privileges or immunities "[tihe right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances, [and] the privilege of the writ of habeas
180. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 118 (Bradley, J., dissenting). Bradley, of course, also
seemed willing to treat the rights guaranteed at common law and catalogued in the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 as privileges and immunities. Id. at 119 (Bradley, J., dissenting). But this, likewise, is
a manageable standard.
181. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1874).
182. Id. at 662.
183. Id. at 663.
184. Fairman indicates that eventually this doctrine was absorbed by substantive due process.
See Fairman, supra note 178, at 29 n.50.
185. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
186. Palmer, supra note 143. See also JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRusT 22 and
notes to page 22 at 196-97 (1980).
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Palmer suggests that Miller must be applying these to the
states, because "[tjhe only way a state could abridge the article I, section 9 habeas corpus right was to grant the federal government the
power to suspend the issuance of habeas corpus beyond the named
emergencies" and this was "ludicrous on its face."' 188
But Palmer overlooked a more obvious example from the days of
the fugitive slave acts. States could frustrate writs of habeas corpus
issued by federal judges by using force and judicial process to declare
prisoners free or by initiating state prosecutions against federal officers residing in state territory or citizens aiding federal officer executing writs of habeas corpus.' 89
Similarly, Palmer's theory does not account for the fact that state
government could attempt to prohibit, or to even place a tax upon
assemblies for purpose of petitioning Congress or the President, just
as they could to attempt prohibit or tax the travel which the Court
condemned in Crandallv. Nevada.190 Indeed, the obvious omission of
free speech and the limitation of the privilege or immunity to assembly and petition suggest the type of "structural" right recognized in
Crandallinstead of the First Amendment.' 9 '
To be sure, judicial decisions and the Supremacy Clause may have
prevented these acts even prior to the Fourteenth Amendment. But
this was also true of the other examples Miller gave. Further, in spite
of the other intriguing points in Miller's opinion which Palmer identifies,' 92 there is no evidence that any contemporary source, including
Miller, understood Miller's opinion in the way Palmer interprets it.
Palmer acknowledges that United States v. Cruikshank 93 would
194
have been an appropriate case for Miller to apply these principles,
but excuses Miller from doing so because without the aid of Field,
corpus."' 1 8 7

187. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 79.
188. Palmer, supra note 143, at 749-50.
189. E.g., Ex parte Bushnell, 9 Ohio St. 77 (1859); In re Booth, 3 Wis. 13 (1854); In re Booth
and Rycraft, 3 Wis. 144 (1854).
190. Palmer, supra note 143, at 764.
191. See Loren P. Beth, The Slaughter-House Cases Revisited, 23 LA. L. REV. 487, 497
(1963). This was what the court later indicated was the case in dicta in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875) ("The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a
right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and
to petition for a redress of grievances."). Palmer considers this possibility and rejects it. Palmer,
supra note 143, at 749.
192. Palmer, supra note 143, at 752 (the amendment "'placed' the privileges and immunities
of national citizenship under the protection of Congress"); id. at 753 n.64 (rights defined in
Corfield "remain, with certain exceptions mentioned in the Federal Constitution, under the care
of the state governments").
193. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
194. Id. at 756.
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Bradley and Swayne, Cruikshank"simply did not seem an appropriate
field of battle."'195 Unfortunately, Miller never found an "appropriate
field of battle." In Hurtado v. California,196 for example, Harlan's
powerful dissent provided a unique opportunity for Miller to explain
Slaughter-House, but he did not do so.
Charles Fairman, having reviewed all of the surviving Miller papers, apparently found nothing to suggest Miller held the view Palmer
attributes to him. 97 Miller's 1880 lectures discussed the Fourteenth
Amendment and Slaughter-House without giving a glimmer of
Palmer's reading and would seem to reject it by indicating that the
First Amendment's Establishment Clause applied only to the Federal
Government and not to the states. 98
The rejection of Palmer's theory returns one to the conclusion
that there is simply no principled basis for Miller's opinion.
IV.

MOTIVATION OF THE JUSTICES

A.

Justice Samuel F. Miller

The question then becomes, why would an "able" Justice write an
opinion which is so clearly and unmistakably wrong? All commentators who have addressed this question have agreed that Miller's opinion was grounded in his strongly held ante-bellum views. 199 Walter
Murphy suggested that Miller's opinion was the result of an "unstated,
and perhaps unconsciously held" premise that the Fourteenth Amend195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. at 769.
110 U.S. 516 (1884).
See generally FAIRMAN ON MILLER, supra note 30.
JUSTICE SAMUEL MILLER, TIE CONsTrruTION OF THE UNITED STATES 67-68, 86-87

(1880). In addition, Palmer's otherwise careful and detailed reading of the Slaughter-House
Cases is mistaken when it refers to Bradley and Field as "Radicals." Palmer, supra note 143, at
757 ("[tlhey are called Radical Republicans for a reason"); id. at 761 ("Bradley ...was a radical."). Field was a War Democrat and maybe even a Unionist, but never a Republican and certainly not a radical Republican. None of the biographical materials on Bradley have suggested
that he was a radical Republican. This is not to say that Field and Bradley were not familiar with
radical Republican theory or that in their effort to find the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment
they did not properly use Radical Republican theory.
199. White, supra note 169, at 115-16. White suggests that all of the Justices were starting
with ante-bellum assumptions and concludes that at least Chief Justice Chase was not acting
upon short-run political considerations, but rather upon strongly held, long-range constitutional
views. Id. See also Beth, supra note 191, at 493.
An intriguing opposite opinion is offered by Miller's contemporary, John Norton Pomeroy.
In 1881 Pomeroy suggested that Miller's opinion was "strange and inconsistent and since Judge
Miller has always advocated views which tend to break down almost all limitations upon the
general government, and to make the legislative powers of Congress almost universal." POMEROY, supra note 25, at 54 n.*.
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ment could not change the fundamental nature of the government. 200
But the more common view is that this was an act of "judicial lawmak'201
ing of which Justice Miller must have been quite aware."
One of Miller's motivations may have been to write an opinion
that served as a compromise among the various contemporary political positions. Michael McConnell sees Miller's decision "as an attempt to assuage the conflict over Reconstruction by prudent
compromise, and as foreshadowing the Compromise of 1877."202 In

McConnell's view, the Court adopted the Northern idea of "equality"
by looking to the Equal Protection Clause to protect the rights of African Americans. 203 But it accepted the doctrine of states rights-not
a post-war Northern view of the importance of the states-but "the
southern, Democratic theory of states' rights" 2°4 in denying any substantive content to the Privileges or Immunities Clause. This, of
course, relegated the protection of African-American rights primarily
to former slave-masters and former Confederate soldiers.
Robert Kaczorowski adopts the same general theory, but
presents it with a much sharper focus. In Kaczorowski's view, the decision was "an example of extraordinary judicial activism" that "annulled a revolution in American constitutionalism. '' 20 5 This was so
because "it represented a rejection of the virtually unanimous decisions of the lower federal courts upholding the constitutionality of
revolutionary federal civil rights laws" adopted in Reconstruction and
also a rejection of the Justice Department's enforcement of those
acts.

2 o6

Kaczorowski argues that the Slaughter-House Cases employed "a
masterful political strategy" because it involved white plaintiffs rather
than African Americans. This allowed the Court to "decide the ex200. Murphy, supra note 7, at 6. Murphy develops this argument in more detail, but rejects
it. Id. at 12-22.
201. NELSON, supra note 12, at 163; DAVID A.J. RICHtARDS, CONSCIENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION 214 (1993) (Miller's motive was not "interpretive" but "politically consequentialis.");
Beth, supra note 191, at 490 ("an obvious attempt to destroy... any affirmative reading of the
fourteenth amendment").
202. Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11 CONST. COMMENTARY 115, 133 (1994).
203. ld. at 134.

204. Id.
205. Kaczorowski, supra note 160, at 151.
In an article which treats Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581 (1871), and Slaughter-House as closely related cases, Robert Goldstein found the Court to be "an ideological and
political leader in the reaction to Reconstruction." Robert D. Goldstein, Blyew: Variations on a
JurisdictionalTheme, 41 STAN. L. REV. 469, 526 (1989).

206. Kaczorowski, supra note 160, at 151.
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ceedingly controversial constitutional issues" in a case that was not
nearly as controversial politically. 207 Further, as Kaczorowski points
out, the political alignment of this decision was confusing. The Louisiana corporation, represented by radical Thomas Durant and Republican U.S. Senator Matthew Carpenter, 20 8 was making states rights
arguments generally "associated" with the Democrats. 209
At the same time, former Supreme Court Justice and Confederate Assistant Secretary of War John A. Campbell was arguing the Republican party's theory of the constitutional amendments to support
the butchers who were supported by the opponents of Louisiana's
state Republican government. 210 These were exactly the opposite of
the constitutional positions the "political partisans" usually took on
questions of the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment and its
various enforcement acts. 21' Thus, the Slaughter-House Cases offered
the Court the opportunity to "neutralize[ ]" the "political fallout"
from its decision. 212
The McConnell and Kaczorowski views are supported by an examination of Miller's background and politics. Until his appointment
on the Court, Miller was an obscure man. He was unknown, even by
reputation, to President Lincoln and unknown to the nation. 21 3
Miller was born into a slave-holding Kentucky family. 214 He himself held slaves until 1850, and he married into a slave-holding fain207. Id. at 175. See also Goldstein, supra note 205, at 526 (indicating that the first oral argument in Slaughter-Housetook place before the decision in Blyew, allowing the Court to "reach
the constitutional question which Blyew seemed to pose, in a case not involving race"); Lou
Falkner Williams, Samuel FreemanMiller, in THE SUPREME COURT Jus-ncEs: A BIOGRAPHICAL
DICrtONARY 317-18 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 1994) ("the Court deliberately chose a case which
would depoliticize the explosive legal questions involved").
208. Carpenter may not have been as active a Republican as he was a practitioner before the
Supreme Court. He was not selected to serve on the Joint Committee on Reconstruction and
played no major role in the drafting of or debate over the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, he
voted against the Civil Rights Act of 1875. 43 CONG. REC. 1870 (Feb. 27, 1875).
209. Id. Kaczorowski, supra note 160, at 177.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. Kaczorowski felt this "neutralizing" effect would take place either way the Court
resolved the matter.
213. In 1879 Miller himself indicated that at the time of his appointment he was "comparatively unknown" outside of Iowa. Address of Mr. Justice Miller, ALBANY L.J. 25 (1879). See also
CHARLES NOBLE GREGORY, SAMUEL FREEMAN MILLER 10, 15 (1907) (giving an account of
John Kasson's conversation with Lincoln in 1862 indicating that Miller was unknown to Lincoln,
and the New York Tribune article of July 26, 1862: "Mr. Miller's name is printed 'Samuel' in the
dispatches announcing Miller's appointment, but we presume it is Daniel F. Miller").
214. Fairman, supra note 178, at 17; FAIRMAN ON MILLER, supra note 30, at 16 n.28. Though
Fairman never indicated how many people Miller's family held as slaves, the Federal Census
Records show that Miller's father had no slaves in 1810, two slaves in 1820, and four slaves in
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ily. 2 15

The flogging of the slave woman who cared for Miller as a
child-probably by Miller's father-was said to be the source of his
antislavery feelings. 2 16 In an 1882 autobiographical account, Miller recalled himself as "an active emancipationist" and indicated that when
the emancipation movement failed in Kentucky in 1848, he thought
217
slavery would never be abolished and decided to move to Iowa.
These facts, when included with Miller's appointment by a Republican President, might suggest that Miller would be sympathetic to
the interests sought to be advanced by the Congress which proposed
the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 18 But Miller's antislavery views do not
appear to have included a commitment to racial equality. While
there were certainly many people who were opposed to slavery who
also had an interest in the rights of African-American people, there
were also many who did not. It is clear that many opposed "slavepower" out of resistance to its influence, rather than from any sympa2 19
thy for the people held in slavery.
None of the biographical material available on Miller suggests
any dedication to African Americans as people or to the broader aims
of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. To the contrary,
Miller's earliest biographer, in treating Miller's opposition to slavery,
indicated that Miller acted "more for the sake of the Whites than from
sympathy for the Blacks." 220
1830. Population Schedules of the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Census (National Archivesmicrofilm).
Fairman discovered that Miller once held a chattel mortgage to secure a debt on a thirteen
year old girl held in slavery by another, with no evidence the note was ever discharged. Fairman
attached no significance to this event. FAiRMAN ON MILLER, supra note 30, at 16 n.28.
215. GREGORY, supra note 213, at 64; FAiRMAN ON MILLER, supra note 30, at 16 n.28.
216. FAIRMAN ON MILLER, supra note 30, at 16 n.28. Fairman also concluded that some of
the positions Miller took in an 1830s debating society corroborated the view that Miller held an
antislavery position. Charles Fairman, Justice Samuel F. Miller and the Barbourville Debating
Society, 17 Miss. VALLEY HIsT. REV. 595, 597 (1931).
217. This document is reprinted in Charles Fairman, Samuel F. Miller,Justice of the Supreme
Court, 1862-1890, 10 VAND. L. REV. 193, 196-98 (1957).
Fairman indicated that Miller "freed" his slaves in Iowa, and this was the effect if he took
people held in slavery to Iowa. But technically they became free by operation of the law when
Miller took them into "free" territory where slavery was prohibited. See generally PAUL
FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM AND COMITY (1981).
218. Lowell F. Schechter, A Comment on the Chase Court and Fundamental Rights, 21 N.
Ky. L. REV. 203, 208 (1993) (suggesting it was significant that Miller was "interested" in "the
issue of slavery" and "had been actively engaged in fighting against slavery" and yet ruled the
way he did in Slaughter-House).
219. See EUGENE H. BERWANGER, THE FRONTIER AGAINST SLAVERY: WESTERN ANTI-NEGRO PREJUDICE AND THE SLAVERY EXTENSION CONTROVERSY 1-2 (1967); Lary Gara, Slavery
and the Slave Power: A Crucial Distinction, 15 CIV. WAR His-r. 5 (1969).
220. GREGORY, supra note 213, at 4. Gregory cites no authority for this statement. See also
Williams, supra note 207, at 320 ("Miller was no proponent of equality for blacks").
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Even Lincoln, who was by no means a radical, articulated pre-war
rights for African Americans. In his first reply to Douglas in the Lincoln-Douglas debates, Lincoln indicated that "there is no reason in
the world why the [N]egro is not entitled to all the natural rights enumerated in the Declaration of Independence, the right to life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness."'22 1 There is no indication that Miller
ever expressed any similar views. 22 2 At least on the issue of suffrage,
Miller seems to have been opposed to African-American rights. 223
The context of Miller's views can most easily be seen by contrasting them with those of Fourteenth Amendment author John Bingham.
Three years after Bingham had publicly called for the abolition of
slavery, 224 Justice Miller wrote his brother-in-law: "[a]n abolitionist
has been my abhorrence all my life."' 225 At a time during the initial
secessionist crisis when Bingham re-introduced President Jackson's
Force Bill of 1833 to help maintain the Union, 22 6 Miller was willing to
221. FirstDebate with Stephen A. Douglas at Ottawa; Illinois (Aug. 21, 1858), in 3 THE CoLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LiNcoLN 16 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
222. In Miller's unsuccessful 1856 campaign for the Iowa State Senate, Miller did state his
"conviction" that slavery was "full of evil" "both to the master and the slave"; that slavery was
"the most stupendous wrong, and the most prolific source of human misery, both to the master
and the slave." Miller's statement "To the Voters of Lee and Van Buren Counties," reprinted in
FAIRMAN ON MILLER, supra note 30, at 28-32. The quoted portion is from page 30.
In an 1869 letter reviewing the history of Reconstruction, Miller indicated that it had been
hoped that the "legal rights and citizenship" of African Americans would have been recognized
by the state governments of the South and that the Johnson reconstruction would have worked if
the black codes had not been framed and the "fiendish hatred" of African Americans could have
been "restrained." Letter from Miller to William P. Balinger (Aug. 29, 1869), reprintedin FAIRMAN ON MILLER, supra note 30, at 193. It is difficult to determine how much of this was a
question of strategy and how much reflected Miller's feelings upon the merits. But the choice of
the word "fiendish" clearly implies disapproval.
Miller seemed generally to disapprove of the murder of African Americans. But, in response to an incident in South Carolina in which several African Americans were killed, Miller
wrote Ballinger that if his "friends will kill [N]egroes, I am glad they select the Presidential year
for that amusement." Letter from Miller to William P. Ballinger (July 26, 1876), reprinted in
FAIRMAN ON MILLER, supra note 30, at 282.
223. For example, on January 11, 1866 Miller described the "most potent" of what he saw as
three factions in the Congress who did not want to work with President Andrew Johnson as
"certain ultra [N]egro suffrage impractiable[s]." Letter from Miller to William P. Ballinger
(Jan.11, 1866), reprinted in FAIRMAN ON MILLER, supra note 30, at 128. A year later Miller
wrote that there were "many [Riepublicans who now regret the extreme policy of the reconstruction acts, in the question of suffrage." Letter from Miller to William P. Ballinger (Dec. 22,
1867), reprintedin FAIRMAN ON MILLER, supra note 30, at 139-40.
224. See generally JoHN A. BINGHAM, AN ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE THE LITERARY
SOCIETIES OF FRANKLIN COLLEGE AT NEW ATHENS, OHIO, ON THE 23D SEPTEMBER, 1851

(1851).
225. Letter from Miller to William P. Ballinger (Mar. 19, 1854), reprinted in FAIRMAN ON
MILLER, supra note 30, at 27. Miller balanced this with the following sentence: "So has been a
proslavery disunionist such as Calhoun & Jeff Davis." Id.
226. CONo. GLOBE,36th Cong., 2d Sess. 219 (Dec. 31, 1860).
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see the country divide into two nations. 22 7 When Bingham was working for the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, Miller was willing
to accept a conservative counter-proposal by certain Southern Gover228
nors and endorsed by President Johnson.
Justice Miller undoubtedly had knowledge of the fact that the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended for it to provide a
mechanism through which the Bill of Rights could be enforced against
the states. Beyond the fact that Miller must be assumed to understand
the meaning and intent of the words of the Amendment as used in the
Congressional debates, Miller undoubtedly had actual knowledge of
the debates. He was a man who watched Congress closely. On January 11, 1866, Miller wrote his brother-in-law about the opening of the
discussion of Reconstruction in both Houses, indicating that it promised to be "able, and somewhat bitter. ' 22 9 This was not a casual comment, for the rest of the letter included an account of Miller's
assessment of President Johnson's goals, the goals of "a large body of
influential [R]epublicans," and an account of three other factions
230
within the Congress and their goals.
227. Letter from Miller to William P. Ballinger (Nov. 11, 1860), reprinted in FAIRMAN ON
MILLER, supra 30, at 36.

228. Letter from Miller to William P. Ballinger (Feb. 6, 1866), reprinted in FAIRMAN ON
MILLER, supra note 30, at 189-93. This alternative Fourteenth Amendment was President Johnson's attempt to "redirect" the thinking of Congress. JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE RATIFICATION OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 138 (1984). Its supporters thought this "flank movement"
would "defeat the Radical program." Id. at 140. While Section 3 of the Johnson proposal contained virtually the same citizenship, due process, and equal protection Clauses as Section 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the privileges or immunities clause was a re-publication of the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause and there was no enforcement clause. Id. (Interestingly, James reprints the clause as if it read the way Miller wrote it in Slaughter-House: "the
citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
several States." But the source which James cites as his authority for his quotation prints the
proposed amendment in the same words as Article IV, "of citizens in the several states." 1 W. L.
FLEMING, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION 240 (1906).) If adopted, this proposal
would have left the Constitution's approach to privileges and immunities exactly as it was before
the proposed amendment.
Indeed, the rejected proposal would have produced the very result Miller reached in
Slaughter-House. The fact that this alternative Fourteenth Amendment was seen as a conservative proposal orchestrated by President Johnson and that it was specifically rejected in favor of
Bingham's more potent formulation, demonstrates that Miller's interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment was wrong.
In an early post-Slaughter-House grand jury charge, Circuit Judge Emmons said that
Miller's opinion was the "equivalent to expunging" the Privileges or Immunities Clause from the
Amendment. The effect of the decision was to leave "the organic law in this regard precisely
where it was" before the Amendment. Charge to Grand Jury-Civil Rights Act, 30 F. Cas. 1005,
1006 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1875) (18,260).
229. Letter from Miller to William P. Ballinger (Jan.11, 1866), reprinted in FAIRMAN ON
MILLER, supra note 30, at 128.
230. Id. at 128-29.
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Miller tried to work closely with Congress to implement his ideas
on judicial reform, submitting "a long communication" to the Chairmen of the Judicial Committees of both Houses prior to Chief Justice
Chase's appointment in 1864,231 advising Chase of the status of a
pending bill in 1866,232 and asking Iowa Congressman and House Judiciary Chairman James Wilson to meet with Chase about a bill pending in the House. 23 3 Miller's close attention to Congress, in and of
itself, suggests that Miller knew the content of the debates.
Even if Miller did not actually follow the Congressional debates,
he had at hand a source which explained Congress' intent to him. In
1868, Judge George W. Paschal 234 published The Constitution of the
United States Defined and Carefully Annotated.235 Paschal made it
clear that all of Section 1 of the Amendment, except the citizenship
clause, had already existed in Article IV, Section 2 and "the thirteen
amendments. ' 236 The "new feature" of the Amendment was that
these "general principles which had been construed to apply only to
the national government, are thus imposed upon the States. ' 237 Thus,
Paschal made it clear that the Bill of Rights had not been enforceable
against the states before, but would be now.
231. Letter from Miller to Samuel Chase (June 27, 1866), reprinted in FAIRMAN ON MILLER,
supra note 30, at 402.
232. Id.
233. Id. Fairman indicated this was Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts. But the bill in
question had already passed the Senate and there is no record of any special relationship between Senator Wilson and Justice Miller. Congressman James F. Wilson had been instrumental
in Miller's appointment to the Court, and was Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee.
234. Paschal was a former Supreme Court Justice of Arkansas and a nationally known Texas
Unionist who had been arrested for "disloyalty" to the Confederacy. Aynes, supra note 6, at 86
n.174. Prior to Slaughter-House, Paschal was counsel in at least four cases heard by Justice
Miller, National Bank of Wash. v. Tex., 87 U.S. (20 Wall) 72 (1873); Board of Comm'rs v.
Gorman, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 661 (1873); Texas v. White, 131 U.S. 95 (1870); Texas v. White, 74
U.S. (1 Wall.) 700 (1869), and a party in a fifth case Miller heard. In re Paschal, 77 U.S. (10
Wall.) 483 (1870) (dispute over Paschal's fee in Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (1 Wall.) 700 (1869)).
Miller authored National Bank v. Texas, where he was called upon to review Paschal's deposition testimony. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 72, 77, 81-82 (1874). The Lawyer's Edition, 22 L. Ed. 295,
indicates that NationalBank v. Texas was argued on April 18, 1872; affirmed on March 17, 1873;
reargued and the judgment vacated on May 1, 1873; and a new decision issued April 20, 1874.
Paschal's testimony was quoted, 87 U.S. at 77, and summarized, 87 U.S. at 82.
The Court referred to Paschal by name in two of its cases, once as "a loyal citizen of the
State of Texas," Texas v. Hardenberg, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 68 (1869), and once as one "who had
remained constant to the Union." Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (1 Wall.) 700 (1868).
By 1869 Paschal was living in Washington, D.C. where he taught law at Georgetown while
Justice Miller taught at National University. APPLETONS' CYCLOPAEDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 667 (James Grant Wilson & John Fiske eds., 1888); CHARLES FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION
AND REUNION, PART Two 536 (1987).
235. PASCHAL, supra note 25.
236. Id. at 290.
237. Id.
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Justice Miller was undoubtedly aware of Paschal's treatise because Paschal's close Texas Confederate friend and frequent correspondent was Miller's brother-in-law, home-town friend and life-long
correspondent, William P. Ballinger. 238 Miller used Paschal's treatise
in 1877 to determine John Campbell's age. 239 Though undoubtedly
referring to the book as a whole and not the specific section on the
Fourteenth Amendment, in 1880 Justice Miller referred to Paschal's
treatise as a "very valuable work." 24° Because of its citation in the
Legal Tender Cases,24 1 Miller was also undoubtedly familiar with John
Norton Pomeroy's 1868 treatise which clearly indicated that the Fourteenth Amendment would enforce the Bill of Rights against the
2
states. 24
Finally, Fourteenth Amendment author Bingham and Miller travelled in the same party on a tour of the Pacific Coast in the summer of
1871 when Bingham was speaking publicly on the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 243 For example, Miller heard Bingham's
Portland, Oregon speech of almost an hour "upon the relation and
dependence of the States to the Nation." 2 " This was a speech which
U.S. District Judge Matthew P. Deady described as "logical, eloquent
and grand. '245 As Howard J. Graham concluded, "[i]t hardly seems
possible . . . that Justice Miller was unfamiliar with the framers' view
"246

One explanation for Miller's majority opinion is the contempt
which he held for the Congress which proposed the Fourteenth
Amendment. While Miller undoubtedly knew the intent of Congress,
238. See JAMES MARTEN, TEXAS DIVIDED 72-74 (1970) (Paschal-Ballinger relationship); see
generally FAIRMAN ON MILLER, supra note 30 (Ballinger-Miller relationship).
239. Letter from Miller to William P. Ballinger (Mar. 18, 1877), reprintedin FAIRMAN ON
MILLER, supra note 30, at 351.
240. MILLER, supra note 198, at 34.
241. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 602 n.152 (1871) (Clifford, J., dissenting).
242. POMEROY, supra note 25, at 147-51. Miller may not have felt bound by the reading of
the Fourteenth Amendment by Paschal and Pomeroy. But, even if it were assumed that Miller
had no constructive or actual knowledge of the debates, the conclusions of these two treatises
should have caused Miller, if he was acting in good faith, to at least test his own views against the
Congressional debates.
243. THE DIARY OF JUDGE MATTHEW P. DEADY 28 (Malcolm Clark, Jr. ed., 1975) (entry of
July 18, 1871). A newspaper account indicated that Bingham had said the result of the Civil War
and the Fourteenth Amendment was that "no State will attempt to set up an authority in opposition to human rights." Our Visitors, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, July 19, 1871, at 3 (col. 2).
244. Our Visitors, supra note 243, at 3 (col. 2). The local newspaper characterized Bingham's
speech as follows: "The address on the whole, was an able and intellectual effort. It was upon a
much higher plane than that of common partisan speeches, and was received with great satisfaction by the audience." Id
245. Id.
246. HOWARD J. GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CONsTTruTION 124 (1968).
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he had little respect for Congress. Congress' performance in Reconstruction, as well as its failure to enact what Justice Miller viewed as
needed reform in the federal judiciary, led Miller to develop a "rather
poor opinion of Congress' performance. '247
Approximately a year before his opinion in Slaughter-House,
Miller termed the Senate Judiciary Committee "the damnest nuisance
the Congress presents." 248 Miller apparently thought the problem was
that "[e]very man on it thinks himself the embodiment of constitu29
tional wisdom and statesmanship, and each is jealous of the other." 4
Miller was "heart sick" because of Congress' preoccupation with
Reconstruction, which he saw as "politics," and its failure to give what
he viewed as sufficient attention to his own proposals for judicial reform. 250 This caused him to characterize the judiciary committees of

both houses as "political committees" and the committee members as
"politicians par excellence."' 251
Miller's greatness, according to his biographer, was not in "legal
learning but in statesmanship. '252 "Statesman" Miller was troubled
by the Congressional (and perhaps national) majority. Miller was
"worried about the possibility of balanced government being over247. Letter from Miller to William P. Ballinger (Apr. 23, 1872), reprinted in Fairman, supra
note 217, at 202.
248. Letter from Miller to William P.Ballinger (Apr. 23, 1872), reprinted in FArmAN ON
MILLER, supra note 230, at 403. See also Letter from Miller to William P. Ballinger (Mar. 9,
1872), reprintedin FAMiuAN ON MILLER, supra note 30, at 404 ("the greatest nuisance of its kind
in either House of Congress").
249. It At this point one is tempted to note that it was obviously impossible for any of the
members of the Senate to be the "embodiment of constitutional wisdom and statesmanship,"
because it was Miller who enjoyed that role.
250. I& Miller was opposed to the system of riding the Circuit and by 1872 was himself preoccupied with the dramatic increase in the docket of the Court, "an increase of which very few
persons have any just conception." Samuel H. Miller, Judicial Reforms, 2 U.S. JURIST 1 (1872),
quoted in FELiX FRANKFURTER & JAMEs LANDIS, THE BusINEss OF THE SUPREME COURT: A
STUDY OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYsTRE 61 n.20 (1927).

In a private letter to his brother-in-law, Miller complained about the "vast increase" in the
Court's docket and expressed concern that if it continued to increase at this rate even his proposals could not solve the problem. Letter from Miller to William P. Ballinger (Mar. 9, 1872), reprinted in FAIRMAN ON MILLER, supra note 30, at 404. Concerns about the increase in the
court's docket are also found in Letter from Miller to William P. Ballinger (Apr. 23, 1872),
reprinted in FAIRMAN ON MILLER, supra note 30, at 403, and Letter from Miller to William P.
Ballinger (Oct. 24, 1872), reprinted in FAIRMAN ON MILLER, supra note 30, at 404.
251. Fairman, supra note 217, at 202.
252. Fairman, supra note 216, at 600. Writing in 1957, Fairman commended Justice Miller to
lawyers as "a responsive and ever-helpful companion" because Miller was "[g]reat in spirit, in
mental power, in sense of right, and in patriotism." Fairman, supra note 178, at 208. Indeed, one
of Fairman's earliest articles on Miller was subtitled A Study of a Judicial Statesman. Fairman,
supra note 178.
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turned by an irresponsible crew in Congress bent on wrecking an in'253
dependent executive and judiciary.
Charles Fairman concluded that Reconstruction convinced Miller
'254
to regard Congress "as the least reliable branch of government.
On February 4, 1867, while the Fourteenth Amendment was under
consideration by the state legislatures, Miller wrote his former law
partner, a Radical Republican. Miller saw his former partner's radical
views as a proposal "to prostrate the judicial and executive branches
of the government, at the feet of the legislative or at the behest of a
'255
temporary popular majority.
Two months later Miller wrote his brother-in-law that "[t]he
strain upon constitutional government, from the pace at which the majority is now going, is one which cannot be much longer continued
without destroying the machine. '256 In early 1868 Miller wrote:
[I]n the threatened collision between the Legislative branch of the
government and the Executive and judicial branches I see consequences from which the cause of free government may never recover in my day. The worst feature I now see is the passion which
governs the hour in all parties and all persons who have who have
257
controlling influence ....
In addition to contempt for the Congress, a view of the electorate
as a "temporary" majority, and a fear that Congress' actions would
ruin the government, Miller had the temperament to interpose his
own will against that of the political process. According to Fairman,
Miller had confidence "in his own mental power," "a certain impatience with lesser minds," and "a touch of wolfishness" towards people who disagreed with him. 258 While complaining about the

253. William Gillette, Samuel Miller, in 2 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
1789-1978, at 1017 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1980).
254. Fairman, supra note 217, at 201.
255. Letter from Miller to John W. Rankin (Feb. 4, 1867), reprinted in FAIRMAN ON MILLER,
supra note 30, at 137 (emphasis added).
256. Letter from Miller to William P. Ballinger (Apr. 24, 1867), reprinted in FAIRMAN ON
MILLER supra note 30, at 138. This only was part of Miller's analysis. Southern adoption of the
Reconstruction plan could slow down "the onward course of public affairs." Id. Seven months
later Miller wrote that "the progress of Congress in invading the functions of the Executive and
Judicial branches of the Government, was only less dangerous than a return to power of the
[D]emocratic party...." Letter from Miller to William P. Ballinger (Dec. 22, 1867), reprintedin
COURT,

FAMMAN ON MILLER, supra note 30, at 140.

257. Letter from Miller to William P. Ballinger (Jan. 19, 1868), reprinted in FAIRMAN ON
supra note 30, at 140. Miller included the Supreme Court in the group affected by
"passion." Id.
258. Fairman, supra note 216, at 600.
MILLER,
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"political feeling" in the Court, Miller admitted that "perhaps" he had
259
his "share" of political feelings.
Miller also admitted he had "strong passions, an excitable temperament, ardent desires and powerful antipathies. ' 260 In reviewing
this statement and other incidents in Miller's life, his principle biographer wrote that "[ilt was Miller's way to continue to march breast
forward, firm in the right as he understood it."' 261 These are the traits
of a justice who, if he could, would disregard the action-even a constitutional amendment-by a branch of government he did not respect
to avoid a result he thought unwise.
Miller was disappointed when he was not appointed as Chief Justice to succeed Chase. While he blamed the "intrigue" of Bradley and
Swayne for his being "passed over," he thought the substantive reason
was his opinion in Slaughter-House.262 This may well have reflected
Miller's acknowledgement that he betrayed the intent of his party in
rendering that decision.
B.

Other Members of the Majority
1. Justice Nathan Clifford

Nathan Clifford "was at once the most prolix and the most pedestrian member" of the Court 263 and "did not succeed in penetrating

central questions of constitutional interpretation. ' '264 The most striking fact about Clifford was his intense partisanship. Justice Miller de259. Letter from Miller to Charles P. Ballinger (Feb. 10, 1870), reprintedin Fairman, supra
note 178, at 18.
260. Letter from Miller to William P. Ballinger (Oct. 3, 1879), reprinted in FAIRMAN ON
MILLER, supra note 30, at 279.
261. FAIRMAN ON MILLER, supra note 30, at 279.
Similar views were expressed in GREGORY, supra note 213. Gregory was the Dean of the
College of Law of the University of Iowa. Id. at xii. Gregory explained Miller's depreciation of
juries as "that contempt which a distinctly arbitrary judge is apt to feel for any impediment to his
own will", id. at 33, and indicated that the failure to refer to previous decisions were made "with
an accent almost of contempt for any other view." Id. at 20.
In memorial services for Miller the Attorney General of the United States lamented the fact
that "[ulndiscriminating eulogy has said that Judge Miller was wont to sweep away law in order
that justice might prevail." Nevertheless, Chief Justice Fuller noted that one of the characteristics of Justice Miller's opinions was "undoubting firmness of conclusion." In Memoriam, 137 U.S.
701, 705, 707 (1890).
262. Kaczorowski, supra note 160, at 188 n.160 (citing and quoting from letter of Miller to
David Davis (Sept. 7, 1873), David Davis Papers, Chicago Historical Society).
263. FAIRMAN, supra note 157, at 77.
264. William Gillette, Nathan Clifford, in 2 THE JusTicEs OF T1E UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT, 1789-1978, at 972 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1980). See also David P. Currie,
The Most InsignificantJustice: A PreliminaryInquiry, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 466, 473-77 (1983) (an
article, though humorous in nature, suggesting Clifford as one of three justices for consideration
as the most insignificant justice).
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'265

Clifford was "the

last will and testament of antebellum Democracy, grown crusty and
bankrupt in its obsession with centralization of authority and concentration of power in Washington."' 266 Clifford's long Democratic career
included opposition to abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia 267 and opposition to "mean and incendiary schemes" to base rep268
resentation on free persons, abrogating the three-fifths clause.
His national prominence came from his service as President
Polk's Attorney General where he supported the war with Mexico
which was such an anathema to antislavery advocates. 26 9 Indeed, by
the time of his appointment to the Supreme Court Clifford was so
well-known as known as a "pro-slavery Democrat," and a "dough270
face" that there was a "storm of protest" over his appointment.
A sense of his petulance can be gathered from the fact that when
Whig William Henry Harrison was elected president, Clifford referred
to him as "an imbecile old man" and refused to attend his inauguration. 271 Similarly, Clifford considered President Hayes an "usurper"
2 72
and refused to enter the White House while Hayes was President.
It is not surprising that Clifford's contemporaries felt he had "little sympathy with the rise and growth of the enlarged views of national authority and Federal power which soon afterward
obtained. '2 73 There is nothing in Clifford's public life suggesting support for the Fourteenth Amendment.
Yet Clifford undoubtedly knew the intent of the Amendment
from the public debates. Further, Justice Clifford cited as authority in
his 1871 dissenting opinion in Knox v. Lee27 4 the 1868 treatise of John
Norton Pomeroy. 275 Pomeroy unequivocally indicated that the adop265. Gillette, supra note 264, at 967.
266. Id. at 973.
267. PHILIP G. CUFFORD, NATHAN CLIFFORD, DEMOCRAT 25 (1922).
268. Id. at 101-02. See also CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 1st Sess. 476 (Apr. 24, 1840).
269. CLIFFORD, supra note 267, at 156.
270. Id. at 270; Gillette, supra note 264, at 967.
271. CLIFFORD, supra note 267, at 107. In describing this incident, the author, Clifford's
grandson, referred to Harrison as "the despised Whig" and to Clifford as "the ultra Democrat"
whose "sensibilities" could not bear to see the inauguration. Id.
272. Id. at 323.
273. Id. at 291 (quoting a New York Tribune article of an undisclosed date).
274. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 602 n.* (1871).
275. Pomeroy was then Dean of the Law School and Griswold Professor of Political Science
at the University of New York. POMEROY, supranote 25, at 5. He was an important Republican
theoretician, HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 133, at 409, who has been called "[t]he greatest
legal scholar of the day." John V. Orth, The Eleventh Amendment and the North CarolinaState
Debt, 59 N.C. L. REV. 747, 761 (1981) (referring to 1883). For a more modest assessment of
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tion of the Fourteenth Amendment would enforce the Bill of Rights
against the states.276
2. Justice David Davis
David Davis, Lincoln's campaign manager at the 1860 Republican Convention, was not an unnatural choice for the Supreme Court.
Indeed, Stanley Kutler described him as "rich in judicial experience. '277 Yet, except for Ex parte Milligan,278 Davis "wrote few noteworthy opinions"2 79 and gave us little basis upon which to judge his
ability as a Supreme Court Justice.
We do know, however, that Davis was not a likely candidate for a
sympathetic reading of the Fourteenth Amendment. "[S]ome of the
abolitionist wing of the Illinois Republican Party" opposed his nomination to the Court. 280 During the Civil War "there was some deterio281
ration in Davis' relationship" with Lincoln.
This split appears to have occurred over two substantive issues.
The first was over the trial of civilians by military commissions in
which Davis triumphed in Ex parte Milligan.282 More importantly,
Davis also split with the President over emancipation. He not only
opposed emancipation but urged Lincoln to withdraw his proclamation after it was issued. 283 Given his opposition-even if it was based
upon tactical grounds-to emancipation itself, Davis is unlikely to
have been sympathetic to the goals of protecting Southern Blacks
through the Fourteenth Amendment as its framers intended. Indeed,
as late as April 1868 Davis thought "[b]oth parties have run into extremes" 2s 4 and confessed "a great alarm at the tendency to consolidated Govt manifested by the Republican party. This alarms me more
than all other things besides . .. .,285
Pomeroy's prominence, see Stephen A. Siegel, Historism in Late Nineteenth-Century Constitutional Thought, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 1431, 1453-55.
Pomeroy was later to work to assist Justice Field in his efforts to become President. FAIRMAN ON MILLER, supra note 30, at 297.
276. POMEROY, supra note 25, at 145-51.
277. Stanley I. Kutler, David Davis, in 2 THE JUS-ICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT, 1789-1978, at 1045 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1980).
278. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
279. Kutler, supra note 277, at 1045.
280. Id. at 1048.

281. Id.
282. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
283. Kutler, supra note 277, at 1048.

284. FAIRMAN, supra note 157, at 153 (quoting portions of a letter from Justice Davis to
Judge Rockwell, his brother-in-law, on April 22, 1868).
285. Id. at 484.
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Given Kutler's description of Davis as "deeply entangled in personal and partisan politics," and Miller's claim that "every act" of Davis' life was governed by "his hope of the Presidency, ' '286 one can
hardly be assured that his vote in the Slaughter-House Cases was a
concerted effort to implement the intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.
3. Justice William Strong
Justice Miller's majority also included William Strong. Strong has
not been the subject of any full-length biography, but is generally considered to have been an "average" Justice who spent "ten years on the
High Court in relative obscurity. ' 287 Strong's area of expertise was
patent law and most of the other opinions he was assigned to write
were in the areas of admiralty, revenue law, and common law
88
questions. 2
Strong had been elected as a Democrat to the House of Representative in 1846 and was re-elected in 1848. 289 In 1857 he was elected
as a Democrat to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 290 Strong's
most noted decisions on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court sustained
the constitutionality of the Legal Tender Act.29 1 Though he is thought
to have become a Republican sometime between 1857 and 1861, it is
not known whether he supported the election of President Lincoln in
1860.292 There is also no evidence of his having supported the passage
of the Fourteenth Amendment. As late as 1874 Strong was described
"[i]n political faith" as having been "a Democrat of the old school"
without any acknowledgment of the fact that Strong became a
Republican. 293
286. Letter from Miller to William P. Ballinger (Dec. 5, 1875), reprinted in FAIRmAN ON
MILLER, supra note 30, at 373-74. Davis left the Court to accept an appointment as Illinois'
Democratic U.S. Senator. Kutler, supra note 277, at 1052.
287. Stanley I. Kutler, William Strong, in THE JUSTICES OF T1E UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT, 1789-1978, at 1153 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1980).

288. Id. Fairman's assessment is similar. Strong's "great strength" was seen chiefly "in the
private law fields." Fairman, supra note 6, at 64. As Fairman was to phrase it later, Strong's
"contributions" were "in the competent disposition of humdrum litigation." Charles Fairman,

The Supreme Court in 1878, 64 A.B.A. J. 1024, 1028 (1978).
289.
290.
291.
In

Kutler, supra note 287, at 1154.
Id.
Shollenberger v. Brinton, 52 Pa. 9 (1866).
Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871), Strong and Bradley promptly joined the

minority from Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870), to create a new majority in
reversing Hepburn and upholding the act.
292. Kutler, supra note 287, at 1154.

293. TiH BIOGRAPHICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
409 (1874). Strong did render a nationalist decision in United States v. Given, 25 F. Cas. 1324
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Strong's political and judicial philosophies were manifest in his
opinion in Blylew v. United States. In that case, there was a challenge
to Kentucky's statute prohibiting African Americans from testifying
in cases in which white people were parties. The United States District Attorney brought the case under the 1866 Civil Rights Act, which
provided that "citizens, of every race and color, shall have the same
right in every State... to... give evidence. '' 294 In what has been said
to be the beginning of "the substantial devastation of the federal government's civil right powers" 2 95 and a "tortured interpretation of the
law,''296 Justice Strong rejected the removal remedy provided by Congress. While Strong carried with him the votes of Justices Miller, Clifford, Davis and soon-to-be Slaughter-House dissenter Field, Justice
297
Bradley and Swayne dissented.
There is nothing in Justice Strong's background to suggest that he
would give a sympathetic interpretation to the intent of the framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 298 To the contrary, Strong's background
makes it unlikely that he welcomed the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
4.

Justice Ward Hunt

Finally, Miller needed the vote of Justice Ward Hunt, who had
been appointed by President Grant. 299 Hunt had served as a Justice of
the New York Court of Appeals (1865-1869), as its Chief Justice
(1868-1869), and as a Commissioner of Appeal (1869-1873).3 0o There
(C.C.D. Del. 1873) (No. 15,210), which is thought to be inconsistent with his approach in Slaughter-House.
The exact date of Given is not set forth in the opinion. Professor Kaczorowski indicates that
it was decided "[j]ust weeks" before Slaughter-House. Kaczorowski, supra note 160, at 191.
Kaczorowski also suggests that the views Strong expressed in Given should have caused him to
join the dissents in Slaughter-House and that there is no explanation for Strong's change of
position. Id.
294. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581 (1872). The April 1, 1872 date of the decision is taken from 20 L.
Ed. 638.
Both the Kentucky statute and the relevant portion of the Civil Rights Act are reprinted in
Blylew, 80 U.S. at 581-82.
295. This conclusion, as well as a powerful account of Blyew and an insightful analysis of the
issues before the Court, are found in Goldstein, supra note 205, at 474.
296. Kutler, supra note 287, at 1158.
297. Goldstein, supra note 205, at 500. Chief Justice Chase and Justice Nelson did not participate in this case. Id. at 500 n.118.
298. Yet when the Civil Rights Cases were decided in 1883 Strong, who had retired, told
Harlan that "[it] may be that you are right." Letter from John M. Harlan to Mallie Harlan,
(undated), quoted in Alan F. Westin, John Marshall Harlan and the ConstitutionalRights of Negroes: The Transformationof a Southerner, 66 YALE L.J. 637, 681 (1957).
299. Stanley I. Kutler, Ward Hunt, in THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT, 1789-1978, at 1221 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1980).
300. Id. at 1222.
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is no indication that Hunt had any significant experience with constitutional issues in his past judicial experience. 30 ' On the other hand, as
Chief Justice of the New Court of Appeals, Hunt authored a majority
opinion which prohibited the driving and slaughtering of cattle in certain portions of New York City.3° He may have been the member of
the Court with the greatest knowledge of the health implications of
the Louisiana ordinance.
Justice Miller, while considering Hunt a "cultivated lawyer and
gentlemen," found him "not a very strong man in intellect. '30 3 According to Fairman, Hunt's "most significant act" on the Court was
"casting the decisive vote" in Slaughter-House.30 4
Though originally a Jacksonian Democrat, Hunt supported Martin Van Buren as a Free Soil candidate in the election of 1848 and was
an organizer of the New York Republican Party in 1855.305 If Hunt
remained true to these early antislavery views, he may have been the
only member of the majority sympathetic to the aims of the Fourteenth Amendment.
It may be significant to note, however, that Hunt began service
on January 9, 1873, 306 Slaughter-Housewas argued for the second time
on February 3-5, 1873, 307 and the decision was announced on April 14,
1873.308 Whether his prior judicial experience prepared Hunt to independently assess the issues in such an important case so soon after his
appointment to the Supreme Court is unknown.
301. He authored only four published opinions treating constitutional issues. See Metropolitan Bd. of Health v. Heisler, 37 N.Y. 661 (1868) (act creating sanitary district did not violate the
state constitution and did not violate the jury trial and due process provisions); Gaskin v. Meek,
42 N.Y. 186 (1870) (act was void under the state constitution because it embraced two subjects);
Vose v. Cockcroft, 44 N.Y. 415 (1871) (state statute was void because it conflicted with the
exclusive admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts); First Nat'l Bank of Sandy Hill v. Fancher,
48 N.Y. 524 (1872) (following U.S. Supreme Court precedent, attempt to tax national bank was
unconstitutional).
302. Metropolitan Bd. of Health, 37 N.Y. at 661.
303. Kutler, supra note 299, at 1228 (quoting Justice Miller).
304. Fairman, supra note 288, at 1030.
305. Kutler, supra note 299, at 1221. Hunt appears to have owed his appointment to the
Court to Senator Roscoe Conkling. See Judith K. Schafer, Roscoe Conkling, in THm OXFORD
COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT 417 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992); Marian C. McKenna, Ward
Hunt, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO Ta SUPREME COURT 178 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992). See
also Letter from Miller to William P. Ballinger (Dec. 14, 1879) reprintedin FAIRMAN ON MILLER,

supra note 30, at 377.
Hunt had been a supporter of Representative and Senator Roscoe Conkling, a Republican
from New York. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Ward Hunt (Aug. 16, 1864), reprinted in 7
THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LNcoLq 498 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) (responding to

Hunt's
306.
307.
308.

inquiry seeking support for Conkling's Congressional election).
Kutler, supra note 299, at 1221.
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 44.
Id. at 57.
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C.

The Dissenters

1. Justice Stephen Field
Stephen Field is generally thought of as a Democrat. But he was
appointed to the Court by Lincoln, in spite of his Democratic background, because he was one of California's strong Unionists. 30 9 Indeed, the creation of a tenth Justice in 1863 was "partly to insure that
the Pacific Coast circuit would be headed by a man familiar with the
region's peculiar legal problems. ' 310 Field was the unanimous bipartisan choice of California's members of Congress. 31' In 1864 the Republican Party had become the National Union Party in order to
create a coalition with the War Democrats. Field's attitude on the
Fourteenth Amendment may be seen by a portion of his June 30, 1866
letter to Chief Justice Chase: "The proposed amendments to the Constitution, prepared by the committee on reconstruction, and passed by
Congress appear to me to be just what we need. I think all members of
312
the Union party can unite cordially in their support."
Though much of the Democratic party saw President Johnson as
their ally, this was not the case with Field, again manifested in this
passage from the same letter to Chase: "If the President withholds his
approval he will sever all connection with the Union party. Two things
are certain-the American people do not intend to give up all that
they have gained by the war-and they do intend that loyal men shall
govern the country. ' 313 Unlike Miller, Davis and Clifford, Field welcomed the Fourteenth Amendment.
2.

Justice Joseph Bradley

One of the key dissenters was Justice Joseph Bradley. 3 14 Bradley,
like many members in the majority, had Republican credentials, but
309. Loren P. Beth, Stephen Johnson Field, in Tim OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME
COURT 290 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992).
310. Robert McCloskey, Stephen I. Field in 2 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT, 1789-1978, at 1073 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1980).
311. Id.
312. Letter from Field to Samuel Chase (June 30, 1866), quoted in CARL BRENT SWISHER,
STEPHEN J. FIELD: CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAW 145-46 (1969).
313. Id.
314. Most of the important biographical work on Bradley has been done by Charles Fairman.
CHARLES FAIRMAN, FIVE JUSTICES AND THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION OF 1877 (1988); Charles

Fairman, Mr. Justice Bradley, in MR. JUSTICE 73 (Allison Dunham & Philip B. Kurland eds., rev.
ed. 1964) [hereinafter Fairman, Mr.Justice Bradley]; Charles Fairman, The So-Called Granger
Cases, Lord Hale and Justice Bradley, 5 STAN. L. REv. 587 (1953); Charles Fairman, The Education of a Justice:Justice Bradley and Some of his Colleagues, 1 STAN. L. REv. 217 (1949); Charles
Fairman, Mr. Justice Bradley's Appointment to the Supreme Court and the Legal Tender Cases, 54
HARV. L. REV. 977 (1941); Fairman, supra note 6.
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not necessarily those which would suggest he was sympathetic with
the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bradley was truly a
"railroad" lawyer, with the Amboy and Camden Railroad as his major
client. Before his appointment to the Court, Bradley became the Secretary of its Board of Directors and, as such, was involved in its*
315

management.
Newark had strong economic ties with the South and, like all of
New Jersey, was largely Democratic. 316 Bradley himself once represented those who opposed the argument that the New Jersey constitution abolished slavery.3 17 Finally, Bradley's real commitment was
to the Union and not to abolishing slavery.31 8 Indeed his college classmate and friend at the bar, Cortlandt Parker, described Bradley as a
'3 19
Whig, then a Native American and then a "National Union man.
It was only "as the war went on" that Bradley became a
320
Republican.
At the same time, Bradley, whatever his personal beliefs, was in a
better position than most to be intimately acquainted with antislavery
theory. New Jersey was the scene of the influential antislavery decision of State v. Sheriff of Burlington in 1836.321 This was the same year
in which Bradley and future New Jersey Senator Frederick T. Frelinghuysen graduated from Rutgers. 322 Frelinghuysen and Bradley had
been classmates, best friends, and members of the same literary society at Rutgers. 32 3 After graduation they both read law with Freling324
huysen's uncle Theodore in Newark.
It was Uncle Theodore Frelinghuysen, Bradley's preceptor, who
325
argued the antislavery case in the New Jersey Supreme Court.
315. Fairman, supra note 6, at 56.
316. Fairman, Mr. Justice Bradley, supra note 314, at 73.
317. Daniel R. Ernst, Legal Positivism, Abolitionist Litigation,and the New Jersey Slave Case
of 1845, 4 LAW & HIST. REV. 337 (1986).
318. Ruth Whiteside, Justice Joseph Bradley and the Reconstruction Amendments 230
(1981) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Rice University).

319.

CORTLANDT PARKER, MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY

16 (1893).

320. Id. at 17. Jonathan Lurie found that Bradley was a "conservative" Republican in his
unsuccessful 1862 candidacy for Congress and that his post-war views on "racial relations" were
"virtually identical" with those of southern Democrats. Johnathan Lurie, Joseph Bradley, in THE
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 33 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 1994).
321. Opinion of Chief Justice Homblower, on the Fugitive Slave Law, reprinted in 1 FUGITIVE SLAVES AND AMERICAN COURTS 99-103 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1988). See also Paul
Finkelman, State Constitutional Protectionsof Liberty and the Antebellum New Jersey Supreme
Court: Chief Justice Hornblowerand the Fugitive Slave Law, 23 RUrGERS L.J. 753, 768-74 (1992).
322. Fairman, Mr. Justice Bradley, supra note 314, at 70.
323. Fairman, supra note 6, at 54.
324. Fairman, Mr. Justice Bradley, supra note 314, at 70.
325. Finkelman, supra note 321, at 99.
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Bradley later married Mary Hornblower, the daughter of Chief Justice
Hornblower, who rendered the decision. 326 This background may be
reflected in Bradley's dissent in Blyew, with Swayne concurring, articulating the familiar abolitionist theme that being excluded from testifying in court was one of the badges of slavery which the Thirteenth
Amendment was designed to eliminate and that the 1866 Civil Rights
32 7
Act was designed to accomplish that end.
By the time the Slaughter-House Cases were argued, Bradley had
had more time for reflection upon the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment and to test that reflection against the realities of specific
cases than any other member of the Court. This began with his own
Circuit Court opinions in the Slaughter-HouseCases, one of which was
issued on June 10, 1870, and another on June 11, 1870. 321 Bradley also
participated in the decision concerning relief pending appeal, where
he dissented. 329 He collaborated with District Judge and future
Supreme Court Justice William B. Woods in the preparation of
Woods' Fourteenth Amendment, Enforcement Act opinion in United
States v. Hall.3 30 Like the other Justices, except for Hunt, Bradley participated in the initial Slaughter-House argument of January 11, 1872,
and reargument in February of 1873.
Thus, Bradley's opinion was not the result of an initial reaction to
an unexpected question, but perhaps the most reflective of all the Justices of the Court. Though Bradley himself could hardly be called a
radical Republican, as John Scott has observed, 331 even up to the time
of his lower Court decision in United States v. Cruikshank332 Bradley
"possessed, enunciated, and made widely known, a theory of the Wartime Amendments that classified him, ideologically, among the radical
Republicans. ' 333 Bradley was hardly a radical, but the intent of the
Fourteenth Amendment and its ideological underpinnings were
326. John V. Orth, Joseph P. Bradley, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT
81 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992).
327. Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581, 595, 599 (1872) (Bradley, J., dissenting).
328. 15 F. Cas. 649 (C.C.D. La. June 10-11, 1870).
329. Slaughter-House Cases, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 273, 298 (1869). This portion of the case was
argued on November 18, 1870 and decided on December 2, 1870. 19 L. Ed. 915.
330. 26 F. Cas. 79 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871) (No. 15,282).
See also John A. Scott, Justice Bradley's Evolving Concept of the Fourteenth Amendment
from the Slaughter-House Cases to the Civil Rights Cases, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 554, 557 n.18
(1971) (referring to drafts of January 3 and March 12, 1871 in the Bradley papers of the New
Jersey Historical Society).
331. Scott, supra note 330, at 59-60.
332. 25 F. Cas. 707 (C.C.D.La. 1874) (No. 14,897).
333. Scott, supra note 330, at 59-60.
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widely known and Bradley was in a position to apply them.3 34 Bradley's dissent, consistent with the articulated intent of Congress and
contrary to his own ideological leanings, bears indicia of reliability.
3.

Justice Noah Swayne

Noah Haynes Swayne was born in slave-holding Virginia in 1804,
but his opposition to slavery caused him to move to Ohio.335 His
sincerity in opposing slavery may be seen from the fact that when,
while still in Virginia, his marriage brought slaves, he and his wife "immediately" emancipated them. 336 He was an "active" Democratic supporter of President Jackson and was appointed U.S. Attorney for
Ohio where he served from 1830-1841. 337 Swayne also served as counsel in "several" fugitive slave cases, 338 and at the 1856 Ohio Republican Convention was designated as one of the State Central
339
Committee Members.
That Convention selected Christopher P. Wolcott, brother-in-law
of Edwin Stanton and the attorney who would make the classic antislavery argument in Ex parte Bushnell,34° along with Swayne, to be
District Delegates to the Philadelphia Republican Convention of
1856.341 Swayne supported the candidacy of John Fremont for President in the 1856 election 342 and the re-election of radical Benjamin
Wade to the Senate. 343
334. Murphy notes later that "a radical change [took] place in Bradley's views" and attributed that to his participation in the Electoral Commission and the Compromise of 1877. Murphy, supra note 7, at 562, 565-69. See also, Aynes, supra note 6, at 101-02.
335. Jonathan Lurie, Noah Haynes Swayne, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME
COURT 850 (Kermit L Hall ed., 1992).
336. J. FLETCHER BRENNAN, 1 THE (OHio) BIOGRAPHICAL CYCLOPEDIA AND PORTRAIT

GALLERY 101 (1880).
337. Id. A LEXIS search failed to reveal Swayne's involvement in the prosecution of any
federal fugitive slave cases during this time.
338. l; William Bosch, Noah Haynes Swayne, in THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 455 (Melvin J. Urofsky ed., 1994).
The only reported cases in which Swayne appeared as counsel involving the Fugitive Slave
Law were the Oberlin rescue cases. Ex pane Bushnell, 8 Ohio St. 599 (1858) and 9 Ohio St. 77
(1859). He was co-counsel for the United States in these cases. Though Swayne was undoubtedly familiar with antislavery legal theory before, participation in these cases exposed him to the
most sophisticated version of the comity, no enforcement theory of Article IV.
339. 1 HISTORY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY IN OHIO 72 (Joseph P. Smith, ed. 1898). One of
the delegates to that same Convention was future Fourteenth Amendment author John A. Bingham. Id. at 73.
340. 9 Ohio St. 77 (1859).
341. 1 HISTORY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY IN OHIO supra note 339, at 54.
342. Lurie, supra note 335, at 850.
343. Francis P. Weisenburger, Lincoln and His Ohio Friends, 68 OHIO HIsT. Q. 223, 245
(1959).
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When Swayne's friend Justice McLean died, President Lincoln selected Swayne as his first appointee to the Court. On the Court,
Swayne was a strong supporter of Lincoln's war measures. 3 " His son,
Major General Wager Swayne, was a Congressional Medal of Honor
winner for his Civil War heroism. 34 5 During Reconstruction, Wager
Swayne was the director of the Freedmen's Bureau in Alabama. 346
Swayne's contemporaries held him in high regard during the time
immediately preceding the Slaughter-House Cases. Indeed, one of the
reasons Congress created a "western" Circuit, allowing the appointment of Miller to the bench, was because the lawyers in Swayne's Circuit did not want to be transferred to another Justice. 347 In 1864
Justice Davis indicated that Swayne was "by all odds the best lawyer"
among the Justices appointed by Lincoln: Miller, Davis, Field, and
Swayne. 3 " An 1870 New York decision referred to Swayne was as
one "whose character and learning are deservedly held in very high
respect." 349
After the war, Swayne sustained the constitutionality of the 1866
Civil Rights Act in United States v. Rhodes,350 which relied upon standard antislavery theory. 351 Swayne had joined the four dissenters in
Ex parte Milligan,352 finding that Congress had the power to provide
for the trial of Milligan by a military Commission, although in this
case the trial actually violated the Congressional statute. Though he
agreed with Chief Justice Chase's majority opinion in Texas v.
White,353 he agreed with Justice Grier "as to the incapacity of the

State of Texas, in her present condition, to maintain an original suit"
344. Lurie, supra note 335, at 851.
345. STEWART Sn'AKIS, WHO WAS WHO IN THE CIVIL WAR 636 (1988).

346. Id Swayne's approach to reconstruction may have been influenced by his son's experiences in Alabama. See CHASE PAPERS, supra note 32, at 605. In the week prior to January 7,
1866, Swayne indicated to Chase that Wager Swayne's dispute in 1866 over an unjust law pending in the Alabama Legislature convinced Swayne of the wisdom of Black suffrage.
347. FAIRMAN ON MILLER, supra note 30, at 45. Later Fairman was to write, "[h]astening

public issues, however, called for wisdom of a higher mood, and Swayne's early pre-eminence
was not sustained." Fairman, supra note 288, at 1025.

348. Letter from David Davis to Judge Julius Rockwell (his brother-in-law) (Dec. 12, 1864),
quoted in FAIRMAN, supra note 157, at 11-12.
349. The Comet, 6 F. Cas. 195, 196 (N.D.N.Y. 1870) (No. 3050) (classifying part of Swayne's

opinion as dicta).
350. 27 F. Cas. 785 (C.C.D. Ky. 1867).
351. HAROLD M. HYMAN, A MoRE PERFECT UNION: THE IMPAC" OF THE CIVIL WAR AND
RECONSTRUCTION ON THE CONsTrr-ION 485 (1973). Hyman's statement that this was a "brilliant historical analysis" is overstated. Loren Beth found a "pre-Civil War abolitionist flavor" to
Swayne's dissent. Beth, supra note 191, at 496.

352. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 1, 132, 142 (1866).
353. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 741 (1868).
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in the Supreme Court.354 Swayne also joined Bradley's dissent in
355
Blyew v. United States.
Miller thought Swayne a "timid" man, "much governed by authorities" with which Swayne was "more familiar" than any of the
other Justices. 35 6 Swayne not only knew the authorities, but had "a
just estimate of their relative value. ' 357 But Miller's view was that
Swayne was too much concerned with "the principle of law which
ought to govern" a case and was "not a man much affected by the
358
justice of a case."
Thus, Swayne had the background to understand the amendment
and its history and to be sympathetic to it.as 9 Yet, Miller tells us that
Swayne was careful with authority, not looking to "do justice." These
are the marks of a Justice likely to follow the intent of the framers of
the Amendment.
4. Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase
Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase is often seen as a minor figure in
Slaughter-House because he joined Justice Field's opinion and did
not write separately. But Chase's vote was significant. His diary indicates that he generally did not dissent in cases in which he was in the
minority, because "except in very important cases dissent [is]
inexpedient."360
Prior to holding any political office, Chase was known as the "Attorney General for the Fugitive Slaves" 36 ' and a "walking arsenal of
the law of liberty. '3 62 Indeed, as Les Benedict has stated, Chase was a
"preeminent" politician and statesman in his own time and was "recognized ...

as the architect of the mainstream antislavery constitu-

tional argument.

'363

354. Id.
355. Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581, 642 (1872)
356. Charles Fairman, Justice Miller and the Mortgaged Generation, 23 IOWA L. REV. 351,
373 (1938) (referring to, and quoting from, but not giving a full date for a letter written in the

summer of 1868).
357. Id.
358. Id. Ironically, one could make the same point with respect to Miller's treatment of
Fourteenth Amendment cases involving African Americans.
359. In 1883, Swayne, who had retired, strongly supported Harlan's dissent in the Civil
Rights Cases, writing that it was "one of the great-indeed one of the greatest-opinions of the
Court." Letter from Noah Swayne to John M. Harlan (Nov. 20, 1883), quoted in Westin, supra
note 298, at 681.
360. CHASE PAPERS, supra note 32, at 517 (quoting Chase's diary entry of January 16, 1865).
361. HARRY BARNARD, RUTHERFORD B. HAYES 189 (1954).
362.

HISTORY OF CINCINNATI AND HAMILTON COUNTY

173 (1894).

363. Michael Les Benedict, Salmon P. Chase as Juristand Politician:Comment on G. Edward
White, Reconstructing Chase'sJurisprudence, 21 N. KY. L. REV. 133, 135 (1993).

1994]

JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SLAUGHTER HOUSE CASES

In speaking of the Thirteenth Amendment, the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, and the Fourteenth Amendment, historian Harold Hyman
concluded that "[a]s much as anyone in Washington, Chase knew the
inside history of all these monumental measures. He shared the mo'364
tives, fears, and hopes of many of their backers and opponents."
Chase would have liked the Fourteenth Amendment to have
guaranteed the right to vote for black men.365 But even without that
guarantee, Chase's fear during the ratification process was that the
Fourteenth Amendment might have gone too far to enjoy enough
political support for it to be ratified.366 Chase had given evidence of
being willing to enforce the intent of the Thirteenth Amendment and
acceptance of the Wilson view of Congress' power by his broad reading of the Amendment and the 1866 Civil Rights Act in In re Turner.367 After the proposal of the Fourteenth Amendment Chase
argued for the "adoption of the Constitutional Amendment" to
368
Southern guests in his home.
364. Harold Hyman, Comment on Robert Kaczorowski's Paper, The Chase Court and Fundamental Rights, 21 N. Ky. L. REV. 193, 196 (1993). Contra FAIRMAN, supra note 157, at 1462
("Chase is to be credited with no adequate comprehension.").
For example, on the day of the vote on the Fourteenth Amendment in the House, Chase
hosted a dinner which Congressmen Washburne, Patterson and Hayes, two generals, Secretary
of the Treasury McCulloch, and the Director of the Smithsonian attended. When Bingham
failed to come to the dinner, Chase noted in his diary that Bingham had "made a great speech"
in Congress and was "probably revising the report." CHASE PAPERS, supra note 32, at 610 (diary
entry for May 10, 1866).
The speech to which Chase made reference was Bingham's last speech supporting the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment before the House voted that same day. CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2541-44 (May 10, 1866). In that speech Bingham indicated that the "want" of
the Constitution had been the "power" for the "whole people" of the United States to "protect
by national law the privileges and immunities of all the citizens of the Republic and the inborn
rights of every person against state infringement." Id. at 2542. In speaking about the violations
of these rights by the states in the past, Bingham made specific reference to the Eighth Amendment, quoting, with quotation marks in the Globe version of the speech, "cruel and unusual
punishments." Id.
365. Chase consistently advocated the right of African-American men to vote. He frequently tried to convince others this was the best policy, CHASE PAPERS, supra note 32, at 605-06
(entry of Jan. 7, 1866) and made "universal suffrage" the basis of his attempt to secure the
Democratic nomination for President in 1868. See J.W. SHUCKERS, THE LIFE AND PUaLC SERVICES OF SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 567 (1874) (reprinting a statement that Chase circulated).
366. JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 118 (1956) ("Even
loyal people in Northern states.., might oppose the amendment because of its threat to state
rights.") quoted in Raoul Berger, Activist Indifference to Facts, 61 TENN. L. REV. 9, 15 (1993).
See also FAIRMAN, supra note 153, at 1462 (quoting letter of Chase to Justice Field, April 30,
1866, suggesting that Sections 2 and 4 were enough: "Prohibiting the States from interfering with
the rights of citizens" and granting Congress enforcement power was, in Fairrnan's paraphrase
"beyond what was expedient") (footnote omitted).
367. 24 F. Cas. 337, 339 (C.C.D. Md. 1866).
368. CHASE PAPERS, supra note 32, at 640 (diary entry of Sept. 24, 1866).
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In the Legal Tender Cases,369 Justice Miller complained of the

"desperate struggle" he had to wage against Chase and told of his
effort to keep up "my forces" against "a domineering Chief. '370 Indeed, while Miller complained that "the trouble" with Bradley was
' 371
that Bradley did not recognize Miller's "intellectual preeminence,
Miller said of Chase that there was "no one against whom I would
attempt to measure myself with more diffidence. ' 372 Likewise, Justice
Strong indicated that it was in "semi political" cases, those which were
constitutional or which arose from "legislation during or following
the war," that Chase "showed great power.

' 373

It is unlikely that any such struggle took place here, because
Slaughter-Housewas decided three weeks before Chase's death 374 and
he was ill during that time. 375 But unlike Miller, who was appointed
to the Court primarily to satisfy the requirements of the politics of
geography and regionalism, Chase was appointed because Lincoln
thought well of his abilities 376 and felt confident that as Chief Justice
Chase would preserve the victory of the Civil War. Indeed, even
though Miller had supported the Lincoln administration in its war
measures and Chase had been a political rival and a politically faithless Secretary of the Treasury, it was Chase, and not Miller, whom
Lincoln chose for Chief Justice. And it was Chase, not Miller, who was
most likely to be faithful to the aims of the Fourteenth Amendment.
V. THE

VIEW OF HISTORY:

1873-1949

If, as suggested above, the dissenters were the ones faithful to the
intent of the Fourteenth Amendment, one would expect to find evidence of this in the commentary on the cases. The purpose of this
369. Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. 457 (1871).
370. FAiRMAN ON MILLER, supra note 30, at 170-71.
371. FROM Tm DIARIES OF FELix FRANKFURTER 312 (Joseph P. Lash ed., 1975) (entry of
Apr. 25, 1947).
372. White, supra note 169, at 41.
373. FAIRMAN, supra note 157, at 1476-77.
374. FREDERICK J.BLUE, SALMON P. CHASE: A LnFE IN PoLrrcs 306 (1987).
375. White, supra note 169, at 81. Robert Kaczorowski has speculated that a healthy, vigor-

ous Chase might have been able to gain Justice Strong's vote and turn the minority into a majority. Kaczorowski, supra note 160, at 191. Similarly, David Hughes wondered "what the outcome
would have been had Chase lived in good health." David F. Hughes, Salmon P. Chase: Chief
Justice, 18 VAND. L. REV.569, 614 (1965).
On the other hand, Field's opinion has the appearance of being drafted as a majority opinion. This raises the possibility that the dissenters once had a majority and, with or without a
struggle, one member changed his vote.

376. "Of all the great men I have ever known, Chase is equal to about one and a half of the
best of them." Abraham Lincoln, quoted in SHucKERs, supra note 365, at 488.
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section is to examine the work of historians and lawyers from 1873
through 1949377 concerning the Slaughter-House Cases.
A.

General Reaction of the Press and the Congress

The reaction of the press to the decision was mixed. The Nation

had reacted to the Circuit Court decision of Bradley and Woods by
expressing fear that if it were upheld by the Supreme Court "every
moneyed [sic] corporation in the country is in danger of destruction. '378 By the time of the Supreme Court decision many recognized
the cases as "among the most important decisions ever rendered by
the Supreme Court. ' 379 After encapsulizing the dissenting opinions,
the Chicago Legal News concluded that "the better reason is with the
'38 0
dissenting four of the nine Judges.

The Congressional reaction to the Slaughter-House Cases can be
seen in the debate over what was to become the 1875 Civil Rights Act.
The opponents of the Bill, almost exclusively Democrats, sought to
define all the substantive provisions of the Civil Rights Bill as being
incidents (privileges or immunities) of state citizenship and therefore
outside of the scope of Congress' jurisdiction under the SlaughterHouse Cases.38 1 Many Republicans conceded the general right of the
377. As will be developed more fully below, it appears that Charles Fairman's seminal 1949
article, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5
(1949), marked the end of one era of Slaughter-Housescholarship and the beginning of another.
Prior to Fairman's article, scholars writing on the Slaughter-House Cases found them to be contrary to the intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. This was true even of those
who praised the Slaughter-House decision and who liked its result.
Fairman, by suggesting that a review of the legislative history of the Privileges or Immunities Clause could produce no better results than that reached by the Slaughter-House Cases,
opened the door to the argument that there was no inconsistency between the Slaughter-House
Cases and the intent of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. As a result, after 1949 the
debate changed from a focus upon the desirability of the results of the Slaughter-HouseCases to
question the intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. This new debate produced a
variety of conflicting articles.
378. Monopolies and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1870 Tim NATION 361 (Dec. 1, 1870).
379. The Slaughter-House Cases, 1873 AL..L.J. 289 (May 10, 1873). See also Summary of
Events: United States, 7 AM. L. REV. 732 (1873)(noting that the interpretation of the Civil War
Amendments by the Court "is... one of the most important acts of government, growing out of
the war"); The Recent Amendments to the US. Constitution Construed, 5 Ctu. LEGAL NEWS 414
(May 24, 1873) ("No more important opinion was ever delivered by any tribunal.").
380. The Recent Amendments to the U.S. Constitution Construed, supra note 379, at 414.
381. James B. Beck (D.-Ky.), 43 CONG. REC. 342 (Dec. 19, 1873) ("corporations, and inferentialy... common schools" under state control); John T. Harris (D.-Va. 43 CONG. REC. 376 (Jan.
5. 1874) (no new rights are conferred on Congress and states are free to "manage their internal
policy" as long as "the same protection" is given to life, liberty, and property); William S.
Herndon (D.Tex.) 43 CONG. REC. 420-21 (Jan. 6, 1874) (indicating that the rights protected are
in the Bill of Rights and treaties, but arguing that the subject of the Civil Rights Bill relates to
local matters under the jurisdiction of the states); Milton I. Southard (D.-Ohio), 43 CONG. REC.
app. at 2 (Jan. 7, 1874); William T. Hamilton (D.-Md.), 43 CONo. REC. app. at 362 (May 22,
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state to regulate schools, grave-yards, inns, and opera houses, but still
insisted upon prohibiting discrimination in that regulation under the
Equal Protection Clause. 382 But Senator Frederick Frelinghuysen, a
Republican from New Jersey, indicated that he was "aware" of the
majority opinion in Slaughter-House,but that the Circuit Court opinion "undoubtedly [gave] the true construction to the amendments as
'383
to their application.
In the course of Democratic Senator Allen Thurman's argument
on the Civil Rights Bill of 1875, Thurman indicated that federal privileges and immunities "must necessarily be derived from the Constitu384
tion of the United States," referencing the Bill of Rights.
Conservative Wisconsin Republican Senator Timothy 0. Howe interrupted Thurman to suggest that Article IV, Section 2 referred to
"[p]rivileges of citizens of the United States. ' 38 5 Similarly, moderate
Indiana Republican Senator Oliver Morton insisted that the privileges
and immunities of Article IV, Section 2 were identical with those of
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 386 In the continuing ex1874); William B. Read (D.-Ky.), 43 CONG. REC. app. at 342 (May 29, 1874); William E. Finck
(D.-Ohio), 43 CONG. REC. app. at 949 (Feb. 3, 1875); Eppa Hunton (D.-Va.), 43 CONG. REC. app.
at 119 (Feb. 3, 1875); John A. Smith (R.-Va.) 43 CONG. REC. app. at 157 (Feb. 3, 1875); Allen G.
Thurman (D.-Ohio), 43 CONG. REC. 1791 (Feb. 26, 1875).
382. E.g., Robert B. Elliott (R-S.C.), 43d Cong., 1st Sess. 408-09; William Lawrence (ROhio), 43d Cong., 1st Sess. 413 (Jan. 6, 1874)(Slaughter-House cases "concede the power to pass
this bill."); Benjamin Butler (R-Mass.) 43d Cong., 1st Sess. 455 (Jan. 7, 1874) (indicating agreement with Elliott's analysis of Slaughter-House); Frederick Frelinghuysen (R.-N.J.) 43rd Cong.,
1st Sess.(April 29, 1874); Oliver Morton (R-Indiana), 43 Cong., 1st Sess. App. 359 (May 21,
1874); Timothy 0. Howe (Union Rep.-Wisc.) 43d Cong., 1st Sess. 4148 (May 22, 1874); and John
Roy Lynch (R-Miss.), 43d Cong., 2d Sess. 943 (May 3, 1875).
Senator James L. Alcorn (R.-Miss.), a former Confederate officer, dismissed Miller's opinion in Slaughter-Houseas dicta and used Miller's Crandell v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867)
decision to argue in favor of the Bill. Alcorn suggested that discrimination in transportation
impeded the right to travel as much, or more, than Nevada's tax and that Miller's opinion therefore supported the Act. CONG. GLOBE, 43d Cong., 1st Sess. App. 304 (May 22, 1874).
Representative George F. Hoar (R. .-Mass.) argued that Slaughter-House was irrelevant to
the Civil Rights Bill and relied upon McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U. S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
43rd. Cong., 1st Sess. 980 (Feb. 4, 1875). Representative Benjamin F. Butler (R.-Mass.) limited
the effect of Slaughter-House to "the law of the case" and held it irrelevant to the matter before
the Senate. 43d Cong., 1st Sess. 1792 (Feb. 26, 1875).
383. 43 CONG. REC. 3451 (Apr. 29, 1874). In making this statement, Frelinghuysen was focusing upon the question of whether the Amendment applied to those who were not African
Americans. But Frelinghuysen also quoted from and relied upon that same opinion's interpretation of Article IV. Id. at 3454.
This same opinion, particularly when read in light of Bradley's Supreme Court dissent, left
no doubt that Bradley felt the Fourteenth Amendment enforced the Bill of Rights against the
states.
384. 43 CONG. REc. 4085-86 (May 20, 1874).
385. Id- at 4087.
386. Id. It is unclear whether Morton was suggesting both clauses protected the privileges
and immunities "of state citizens" or that state citizens were also federal citizens and that both
clauses protected national privileges and immunities.
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change between Thurman and Morton, Thurman admitted that the
rights of Article IV, Section 2 were treated as being identical in the
Senate, "in this Hall," but argued that they had not been treated as
the same by the Court. 387 In response to Thurman's assertion that
the Slaughter-House Cases had made "the final determination of what
is the law and Constitution of this land" Vermont Republican George
F. Edmunds, a member of the Senate when the Amendment was pro'
posed, interrupted from his seat: "I do not admit it." 388
The key framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had left Congress
by this time. Death had claimed Thaddeus Stevens and Jacob Howard. John Bingham was denied renomination for Congress and was
about to embark upon an ambassadorship. But the "destruction" of
the purpose of the amendment was lamented by framers such as Senator George F. Edmunds, 389 Senator Timothy Howe, 390 Senator Oliver
Morton, 391 and Senator James Blaine. 392 Former Attorney General

Benjamin Bristow thought the Fourteenth Amendment, once the
Constitution's "crowning glory" was being "frittered away by judicial
construction. "393
B. Legal Commentary
The initial legal commentaries had, of course, indicated that the
minority opinion had the better interpretation of the Amendment. 394
Writing in 1878, former Confederate and Democratic lawyer William
Royall suggested that Miller's opinion was a result of "alarm at the
387. Id.

388. Id.
389.

2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 541 (1928).

Edmunds indicated that Miller's decision was "radically" different from "the intent of the Framers and the construction of the language used by them."
390. HOWARD N. MEYER, THE AMENDMENT THAT REFUSED TO DIE 77 (rev. ed. 1978).

Howe likened Miller's opinion to Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), and
indicated that the people would say "it was not law and could not be law."
391. 4 CONG. REC. 5585 (1876) (complaining that-the Supreme Court had taken the "broad,
ample, and specific" Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and "in some respects almost destroy[ed them] by construction.").
392. 2 JAMES G. BLAINE, TWENTY YEARS OF CONGRESS 419 (1886) (Congress followed the

intent of the framers and the Court had deprived the amendment "in part of the power which
Congress no doubt intended to impart to it.").
393. Letter from Bristow to O.P. Morton (May 6, 1873), quoted in Ross A. WEBB, BENJAMIN
HELM BRISTOW: BORDER STATE POLITICIAN 121-22 (1969). Bristow proposed that a constitu-

tional amendment be sought, but Morton was too ill to pursue the matter. Id.
For that very reason, Mississippi's former Confederate Colonel and future U.S. Supreme
Court Justice, Representative Lucius Q.C. Lamar, praised the Supreme Court as a "refuge" from
reconstruction legislation and referred to the Slaughter-House Cases as an example of the
Supreme Court's protection. 44 CONG. REC. 999 (Jan. 26, 1877).
394. See supra note 379.
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centralizing tendency of the government" and that while the majority's opinion was "patriotic," it was not "wise" to change the meaning
of the Amendment. 395 Instead, Royall argued the Court should have
given the Amendment "a literal construction ... and leave it to the
institutions themselves to cure the evils which flowed from it at the
'396
ballot box."
Royall thought the need for national enforcement came because
states might infringe upon the privileges and immunities of African
Americans. 397 Royall thought the minority view presented "with great
ability" and the majority interpretation not the Amendment's "pri'398
mary and most obvious signification.
The 1890s was probably the nadir of concern similar to those of
the Reconstructionists. 399 Yet during that time John W. Burgess of
Columbia would write that the Court in Slaughter-House had thrown
away the "great gain in individual liberty" won through the Civil
War.400 Burgess thought the Bill of Rights were the privileges and
immunities of natural citizenship and was confident that in the future
the Slaughter-House decision would be see as "intensively reactionary" and overturned. 4°1 Harvard Law Professor James Bradley
Thayer thought the Slaughter-House minority "seems to be the
sounder. '40 2 Independent scholars like corporate attorney William D.
395. William L. Royall, The Fourteenth Amendment: The Slaughter-House Cases, 1878
SOUTHERN L. REV. 558, 576-78 (1878).
396. Id. at 577.
397. Id. at 579.
398. Id. at 559, 563. Indeed, Royall suggested that ninety-nine out of a hundred people would
read the Amendment differently from the majority, and "it is only by an effort of ingenuity" that
the majority could advance its position. Id. at 563.
Charles Fairman discounted Royall's analysis because he represented bondholders opposing
Virginia's Readjuster Movement and later supported Justice Field's bid for the Democratic nomination as President. FAIRMAN, supra note 157, at 1372-74. It is, however, not self-evident how
Royall's acknowledgment that the Amendment was necessary to protect the rights of African
Americans would help the Conservative Party in Virginia or Virginia bondholders. Similarly,
while his political work for Justice Field in 1880 may affect one's assessment of Royall's publications during that time, without a showing of a prior relationship, it does not inevitably follow
that it has an effect retroactive to 1878 which Fairman attempts to give it.
John Norton Pomeroy, another supporter of Field, later referred to Royall's article as a
"very instructive and able" article. See SOME AccouNT, supra note 108, at 128.
399. E.g., RAYFORD W. LOGAN, THE BETRAYAL OF THE NEGRO 88-104 (5th ed. 1970). This
chapter is entitled "The Nadir under McKinley."
400.

1 JOHN W. BURGESS, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

228-30 (1890). Burgess was no radical. He is generally associated with William Dunning and the
"Dunning School" of Reconstruction.
401. Id.
402. NELSON, supra note 12, at 159.

1994]

JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SLAUGHTER HOUSE CASES

Guthrie would conclude that the intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment was to incorporate the Bill of Rights. 4 o3
Ohio Congressman Samuel Shellabarger had been a "principal
Radical theoretician,"'' but as early as 1871 he had indicated that he
did not "want the full idea of the Fourteenth Amendment interpreted
by the old rules of construction. 405 In the memorial services for
Chief Justice Waite in 1888, Shellabarger acknowledged that Waite's
decision in United v. Cruikshank4O6 was contrary to the intent of the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, but indicated that Waite
would still be well thought of by history because "the lapse of years
had matured men's views and cooled their feelings regarding the results of the late war." 4 7 The linkage between an acknowledgment
that the Court had refused to enforce "the letter" of the Amendment
and a feeling that its action was legitimate because the tumultuous
times of Reconstruction called forth no deference is seen in the histories of the Court.
University of Missouri Law Professor Christopher G. Tiedman indicated that if the Court had applied the Amendment's language as
written, it would have put an end to "local self-government. 40 8 The
Court avoided that "disastrous result" by its "bold and courageous"

403. WILLIAM D. GUTHRIUE, LECTURES ON THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 58-59 (1898).

See also Hon. D.J. Brewer, Protection of Private Property from Public Attack: An Address
Delivered Before the Graduating Classes at the Sixty-Seventh Anniversary of Yale Law School
22 (June 23, 1891). Though this speech is often cited for Brewer's declared objective of protecting private property, his statements also refer to the protection of personal rights generally.
404. WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONsTrTUION 164
(1972).
405. Letter from Shellabarger to J. Comly (Apr. 10, 1871), Comly MSS, Ohio Historical Society. The relevant portions of this letter are quoted in HYMAN & WIECK, supra note 133, at 471
(1982). Shellabarger had been the manager, in the House of Representatives, of the 1871 Force
Bill. Id.
406. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
407. In Memoriam" Morrison Remick Waite, L.L.D. 126 U.S. app. 585, 600-01 (1888). In that
same address Shellabarger spoke of "judicially adjusting the constitutional amendments to the
States," id. at 604, and "reconstruct[ing] the symmetry and strength of judicial predominance
over the passions and memories of war." Id. at 607.
Waite's first biographer frankly admitted that Cruikshank and the Slaughter-House Cases
"marked the overthrow of the congressional plan of reconstruction within seven years after the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment." BRUCE R. TRIMBLE, CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE: DEFENDER OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST 172 (1938).

It may be significant that Shellabarger represented the Hayes electors in the 1876 electorial
dispute and may have therefore been involved in the "compromise" of 1877. See CHARLES FAIRMAN, FIVE JUSTICES AND THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION 172 (1938).
408. CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDMAN, THE UNWRIrTEN CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

102 (1890).
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decision in Slaughter-House.409 "The noble fundamental purpose of
the Court" resulted in "checking the literal operation of the fourteenth amendment. '410 The justification for that action was to keep
"the amendment within the limits which [the majority of the Court]
felt assured would have been imposed by the people, if their judgment
had not been blinded with passion, and which in their cooler moments
they would ratify."'411 In explicitly acknowledging that the opinion violated the intent of the people who "ratified" the amendment, and not
just the framers, Tiedman wrote:
Feeling assured that the people in their cooler moments would not
have sanctioned the far-reaching effects of their action; that they
lost sight of the general effect in their eager pursuit of a special end,
the court dared to withstand the popular will as expressed in the
letter of this amendment ....412
modification of
Thus, the Slaughter-HouseCases worked "a successful
'413
the rule found in the fourteenth amendment.
Hampton Carson, writing in 1891, praised the Court as the "great
conservative department government" and justified its actions as seen
"after the lapse of years, when the temper and spirit in which the text
of the Amendments was penned has cooled, and the views of men
'414
have matured.
The new century brought the work of government reformist Horace Flack concluding that the Amendment applied the Bill of Rights
to the states.4 15 Even Justice Moody, who refused to follow the intent
of the Amendment, admitted that "[u]ndoubtedly, [the SlaughterHouse Cases] gave much less effect to the Fourteenth Amendment
'416
than some of the public men active in framing it intended.
409. Id. Bernard Schwartz indicates that Tiedman was "second only to [Thomas] Cooley in
his influence on [the] bench and Bar." BERNARD SCHWARTZ, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN
LEGAL THOUGHT 303 (1993).
410. TIEDMAN, supra note 408, at 106.
411. Id. This theme actually began with the announcement of the Slaughter-House decision.
See Slaughter-House,83 U.S. at 82; Kaczorowski, supra note 160, at 190 n.171 (quotingthe April
24, 1873 Chicago Tribune, which indicated that the Supreme Court had recovered "from the War
fever, and ... abandoned sentimental canons of [constitutional] construction").
412. TIEDMAN, supra note 408, at 102-03.
413. Id. at 108.
414. 2 HAMPTON L. CARSON, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 485-86 (1891). A textbook

for law students in 1899 echoed this view: "It is best, we think, that the amendments which were
adopted in haste, and reluctantly accepted by a portion of the Union, should have been construed as they have been,-mildly." CHARLES E. CHADMAN, CONSTIrrUTIONAL LAW: FEDERAL
AND STATE 169 (1899). Immediately following this sentence is a discussion of the minority opin-

ion in Slaughter-House with an indication that "[a] wiser opinion prevailed." Id.
415.

HORACE E. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 94 (1908).

416. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 96 (1908).
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Four years later a source unsympathetic to reconstruction deter.mined that Slaughter-House and Cruikshank "marked the practical
overthrow of the Congressional ideal for the Fourteenth Amendment
within seven years after its victorious adoption." 417 A year later another commentator wrote that the Supreme Court "began its series of

adjudications under the Fourteenth Amendment by substantially re''
pudiating it. 418
Indeed, in his classic The Supreme Court in United States History,

1836-1919, 419 Charles Warren noted that Miller's opinion was "directly contrary" to the intent of the framers of the Amendment and
that in its history the Court had, with "very little variation" acted to
"controvert the purpose of the Amendment [and] to belittle its effect. '420 Warren welcomed this action by the Court and quoted a por-

tion of Carson with approval. 421
Until 1949 the leading commentaries all suggested that Amend422
ment had been interpreted by the Court contrary to its intent.

Thus, for over seventy-five years the major figures to speak upon the
417. CHARLES W. COLLINS, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE STATES 22 (reprint

1974) (1912). Collins had little sympathy for the goals of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. But he concluded that the "majority of the United States Supreme Court in interpreting
[the Fourteenth] amendment followed, in effect, the reasoning of the Democratic opposition,
and refused to give effect to the ideas of the Radical Republicans." Id. at 15. See also D.O.
McGovney, Privileges or Immunities Clause: Fourteenth Amendment, 4 IOWA L. BULL. 219, 219
(1918) (Supreme Court "completely disappointed the avowed purposes of some of its framers").
418. EVERETT'V. ABBOTI, JUSTICE AND THE MODERN LAW 75 (1913).
419. 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 541 (1928).

420. Id.at 567.
421. Id. at 608. Warren's approval was based in large part on his view that the Court's decision had- "largely eliminated from National politics the [Niegro question" and "relegated the
burden and duty of protecting the negro to the States, to whom they properly belonged." Id.
Carson is quoted with approval in id. at 616-17.
422. For an example indicating that Slaughter-House was incorrect because it defeated the
framers' intent to incorporate the Fourteenth Amendment, see Lucile Lomen, Privileges and
Immunities Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 18 WASH. L. REV. 120 (1943) (designed to overrule Barron v. Baltimore).
There are some commentators who have taken the view that the Court was correct in
Slaughter-House.Fairman does so on the grounds that he could not discover the intent, and that
Justice Cardozo's due process formulation "implicit in ...ordered liberty"' was as good as one
could do in applying it. Fairman, supra note 18, at 139 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325 (1937)).
Arnold Lien, having found that the "tide of extremism and vindictiveness" from early days
"subsided" by 1873 and that congressional leadership had changed (two-thirds of the Joint Committee, including Bingham and Howard, were no longer in Congress), and a lack of any "general
outburst of condemnation" of the decision, concluded that the decision must have been consistent with that of Congress, the legislatures and the people. ARNOLD J. LIEN, CONCURRING
OPINION: THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 82-83

(1958). This analysis, of course, ignores the fact that Lien is comparing the attitude of 1873 with
that of 1868 or even 1866.
Robert Bork has also been unable to discover the intent of the clause and has compared it
to an "inkblot." BORK, supra note 7, at 166.
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Slaughter-HouseCases, whether to praise them or to condemn them,
consistently indicated that Justice Miller's opinion was contrary to the
intent of the Fourteenth Amendment. This history reinforces the view
that Miller's opinion was an illegitimate one.
CONCLUSION

This study has shown that there was a clear consensus that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was to
have a substantive role. That role was to enforce national privileges
and immunities or rights. Those rights, whether examined from a textual, legislative history or policy viewpoint, were chiefly the Bill of
Rights. These views were before the public in the debates of Congress
and undoubtedly specifically known to the Justices.
When one examines the opinion articulated by Justice Miller to
defend the majority decision, one finds the errors so immense and the
gap between the intent of the amendment and Miller's ruling so great,
that many are willing, on that basis alone, to believe the Miller deliberately attempted to defeat the force of the amendment. An examination of Miller's background suggests that Miller was hostile to the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Congress which proposed it. He had
the personality to purposely negate an amendment he felt was unwise.
Miller, of course, had to obtain four other votes to accomplish his
result. But in examining the background and views of the other Justices, we find that staunch conservative Democratic Clifford and antiemancipationist Davis had the background and temperament to join
Miller in such an enterprise. The data on Hunt and Strong is much
more ambivalent, but Strong had been a Democrat most of his life and
no evidence exists suggesting his support for the Fourteenth Amendment. Hunt had been on the Supreme Court bench for less than a
month when the decision was argued and only three months when the
decision was announced.
On the other hand, Chase, Bradley, Field and Swayne were all
part of the "Union" coalition. Field, Chase, and Swayne all welcomed
the Fourteenth Amendment and, while Bradley's views on the adopWilliam E. Nelson views Section 1 as conflicting with local self-rule in a way not seen by the
framers and therefore incapable of being resolved by original intent. In these circumstances,
Nelson concludes the Court did the best it could. William E. Nelson, The Role of History In
Interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1177, 1178 (1992).
Palmer reads Slaughter-House in an unconventional way and suggests that Miller actually
suggested the Bill of Rights were privileges and immunities under the Fourteenth Amendment
and that it was Cruikshank which nullified the Amendment. See generally Palmer, supra note
143.
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tion of the amendment are unknown, his personal and family background no doubt gave him an added sensitivity to the arguments
advanced in support of the amendment.
Bradley's dissent seems to be against his own political proclivities. Swayne appears to be in sympathy with the purposes of the
Amendment, but his personality, as described by Miller, was such that
we can trust him to try to apply their intent and not "do justice" on his
own. Chase had been specifically chosen by Lincoln, over Miller, for
just such an occasion. Chase had the background to know and sympathize with the intent of the framers and yet, because of his own fear
that the Amendment went too far to enjoy majority political support,
can be trusted to have cast his own vote to implement the intent of the
Amendment and not simply his own preferences. Finally, War Democrat Field was also a Lincoln appointee. Field, unlike Miller, Davis
and Clifford, welcomed the amendment. There can be do doubt but
that the dissenters were more likely to properly express the intent of
the Amendment than the majority.
It has been suggested that the Supreme Court has "compensated"
for the loss of this clause by reading some of its purpose into the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses.4 23 Indeed, while Justice
Goldberg suggested that the Slaughter-House Cases should be overruled,424 Justice Douglas indicated that, at least in the Eighth Amendment context, the "result is the same" whether one used due process
4 25
or privileges or immunities.
While the result may be the same in most instances, the proper
interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause would change
our jurisprudence with respect to the unincorporated portions of the
Bill of Rights, primarily in the application of the Second, Third, Fifth,
and Seventh Amendments. Further, its distorts our understanding of
the Constitution to reach a "correct" result through a forced reading
of the Due Process Clause. It makes the Court engage in a decisionmaking process it knows is wrong, and, thereby, teaches everyone disrespect for the Court and the rule of law.
423. Lucie, supra note 7, at 861-62. It has also been suggested that Miller's opinion "obligated" the Justices to read matters into the Due Process Clause which would not have otherwise
been there. See Edwin Borchard, The Supreme Courtand Private Rights, 47 YALE L.J. 1051, 1063

(1938). It is possible that the "distortion" of the Due Process Clause which New Dealers like
Felix Frankfurter and Charles Fairman abhorred was the price to be paid for the "distortion" and
destruction of the Privileges or Immunities Clause which they applauded.
See also LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 554 (2d ed. 1988) (majority
opinion "helped pave the way for the substantive due process doctrine").
424. StrippingAway the Fictions,supra note 7, at 557.
425. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 241 (1972).
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Justice Bradley's "great question" was "[w]hat is the true construction of the [Fourteenth] amendment?" 426 The Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments were designed to establish "universal civil
freedom. '427 Justice Harlan's words in the Civil Rights Cases428 seem
equally applicable to Miller's opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases:
The Supreme Court limited the law of freedom "by a subtle and ingenious verbal criticism" which is inconsistent with the "substance and
spirit" of the Amendment. 429

426. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 124.

427. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 563 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
428. 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883).
429. Id.

